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We are professional men not mere hired hands.1
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2013 we will celebrate (or, at least, commemorate) the century-
mark of the Sixteenth Amendment and the federal income tax.2 We should
anticipate a flow of historical reflections on this first century of income
* J.D., New York University School of Law (1996); Professor of Law,
Texas Tech University School of Law; Of Counsel, Schoenbaum, Curphy &
Scanlan, P.C., San Antonio, Texas. This article was made possible through the
support of the Glenn D. West Research Professorship.
1. Edmond N. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners:
Transcript of the Tax Law Review's 1952 Banquet, 8 TAX L. REv. 1, 9 (1952)
[hereinafter Cahn et al., Ethical Problems] (statements by Jerome Hellerstein).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. For an introduction to the politics of the
Sixteen Amendment ratification and the 1913 Revenue Act adoption, see W. ELLIOT
BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 49-57 (2d ed.
2005) [hereinafter BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA].
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taxation.3 These historical reflections on the income tax should develop our
understanding of what has changed in the past century, and just as
importantly, what has not changed, and will give us some idea of why one
change occurred rather than another in any given case. It is likely that these
reflections will focus on acts of Congress, nearly acts of Congress, and acts
urged on Congress by enthusiastic supporters of one persuasion or another;
the ebb and flow of economic theories and fiscal policies; responses to
political, business, and technological changes; and, of course, important
court cases that went this way and that way and, sometimes, the right way.
Yet the history of the income tax is, in large part, also the history of
tax lawyers. Without these lawyers working to interpret the tax code, to
advise clients on planning with the tax code, and to advocate for the rights of
clients under the tax code, the income tax system would not be what it has
become. The role of these lawyers, especially their own sense of right and
wrong, is rarely the subject of legal histories. Economics, politics, and
financial innovations may make better reading, and may be better at
explaining legal histories, but legal history includes legal ethics.
This article is devoted to exploring the legal ethics writings by tax
lawyers in a pivotal period of income tax history: 1945-1965,4 the first two
decades of the federal income tax as we now know it. Although the income
tax began in 1913, it was World War II that created the modem mass income
tax: in 1939 there were 3.9 million individual income tax taxpayers but by
3. Such reflection has already begun as a recent symposium was held at
Duke to examine the history of the federal income tax. The Duke symposium
included several particularly interesting pieces on "some lesser-known aspects of the
history of the federal income tax." Lawrence A. Zelenak, Foreword: The Fabulous
Invalid Nears 100, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, iii (2010). This symposium
focused in large part on what Professor Zelenak described as "losers' tax history," -
that is "tax roads considered by Congress but not taken, or taken briefly and then
abandoned" - is particularly obscure. Id. at i. One particularly interesting article
describes the period in which the government disclosed the tax return information of
certain high-income taxpayers, while another explains how close the 1940s
proponents of replacing the mass income tax with a sales tax came to victory.
Marjorie E. Komhuaser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a "Common
Man" Campaign Ended a Rich Man's Law, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123
(2010); Lawrence A. Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn't: An Actual
History and an Alternative History, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (2010).
4. 1 have focused on the ethics literatures in the Tax Law Review, the NYU
Institute on Federal Income Taxation, the USC Institute for Major Tax Planning, and
Taxes, but also reviewed some often-cited pieces from outside these periodicals,
such as Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MNTN. L. REV.
412 (1952) [hereinafter Paul, Tax Adviser] (this journal became the University of
Colorado Law Review in 1963).
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1945 there were 42.6 million. 5 This period was also one of significant
progress in the administration of the income tax: the Internal Revenue Code
was re-organized in 1954 and, following widespread corruption scandals, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue was re-organized as the Internal Revenue
Service.6 Thus, the tax lawyers writing on ethics issues during this period
were the first generation to be considering the role of the tax lawyer in the
modem tax system. Perhaps the most importance difference between the
income tax system then and now is that the system then enjoyed broad-based
and bi-partisan support while imposing an extremely high top-end marginal
rate of taxation (91-94 percent for most of this period).7
This income tax system and these writers should also be placed in
their even broader social, political, and legal context. These writers belonged
to the generation that had confronted totalitarianism, the Holocaust, and the
5. Though the richest 1 percent accounted for 32 percent of the income tax
revenue, by the end of the war, almost 90 percent of the labor force filed income tax
returns and 60 percent paid income taxes. The marginal rates of taxation ranged from
50 percent to more than 90 percent during the war. In 1940, the income tax
accounted for only 16 percent of all taxes collected at all levels of government, but
by 1950 it accounted for more than 51 percent. The implementation of the new mass
tax regime "succeeded because of the popularity of the war effort." The two were
connected in the public mind in some part due to a Walt Disney-produced
propaganda cartoon starring Donald Duck and watched by more than 32,000,000
theatre-going Americans in 1942. BROWNLEE, TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 2,
at 115-17.
6. In the early 1950s, a string of corruption scandals prompted Congress to
investigate the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where it discovered the consequences of
political patronage and substantial corruption. More than 200 then-current and
former tax officials resigned, were removed, and/or were indicted. In 1952, Truman
released a plan that reorganized the Bureau, and the reorganization carried over into
the Eisenhower administration. Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue
Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 717, 755-59, 761-64 (2001)
[hereinafter Thorndike, Reforming].
7. "The winning of World War II and a postwar surge of economic
prosperity, which followed so closely on the heels of the Great Depression, all
helped produce a popular, bipartisan consensus of support for sustaining the basic
[tax] policy shifts undertaken during the Roosevelt administration." BROWNLEE,
TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 100-01. This national optimism is reflected
not only in the tax policy of the time but also in the Baby Boom, of course. The
highest marginal tax rates during this period were: 94 percent in 1945; 91 percent in
1946-1951; 92 percent in 1952-1953; 91 percent in 1954-1963; 77 percent in 1964;
and 70 percent in 1965. The history of federal individual income tax rates is
available from the Tax Foundation. The Tax Foundation,
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/151.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2011) [hereinafter Tax Foundation].
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Great Depression. During the time they were writing, the United States
engaged in nuclear warfare to end World War II, 9 the Cold War began, and
the Cuban revolution both began and ended.' 0 Senator McCarthy conducted
a witch-hunt for communists.II The Rosenbergs were executed for
conspiring to commit espionage.12 The Soviet Union admitted supplying
arms to the North Vietnamese and demonstrations against the war in
Vietnam spread. 13 The Civil Rights movement emerged: Rosa Parks and the
students at the lunch counters refused to leave their respective seats, Brown
v. Board of Education was handed down, federal troops were sent into
Arkansas and Mississippi, and the Voting Rights Act was passed.14 There
were massive labor strikes.15 The President of the United States was
assassinated.16 These events should be kept in mind as the literature of the
period was read, as these events make clear that the period in which this
literature was produced was certainly not simpler, fairer, or more moral than
our own.
This Article is divided into two primary sections. Part II is a
description of literature of the era, and Part III is a reflection on the literature.
Part II has several parts. It introduces the writers (II.A) and describes their
philosophical professionalism (II.B) and the patriotic tone of their writings
(I.C). It then describes their debates over a special duty to the system (II.D)
and disclosing arguable points in a tax return (II.E). It concludes with their
practical advice for tax lawyers (II.F) and their policy suggestions for the tax
system (II.G). The reflective Part II provides historical context and
connections between topics that may not otherwise be evident.
8. BERNARD GRUN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY 522 (3d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter GRuN, TIMETABLES].
9. Id. at 524.
10. Id. at 528, 542-44.
11. Id. at 536.
12. Id.
13. GRuN, TIETABLES, supra note 8, at 554.
14. Id. at 538, 550-54.
15. Id. at 528.
16. Id. at 552.
4 [Vol. 12:1
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II. LEGAL ETICS FOR TAX LAWYERS:
A REVIEW OF THE 1945-1965 LITERATURE
A. The Literature's Authors
The men (and they were all men)17 writing on legal ethics and
federal taxes between 1945 and 1965 were professional heavyweights.
Among them were preeminent tax lawyers who were founders of preeminent
law firms. Randolph E. Paul was a founder of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison.18 Mortimer M. Caplin was a founder of Caplin & Drysdale.19
Merle H. Miller was a founder of (the firm now known as) Ice Miller.20
17. Throughout these essays, I have intentionally followed these writers'
use of masculine pronouns and references to lawyers exclusively as male. This
underscores what a different world it was in which these men wrote, as well as
underscoring how that different world was not long ago or in a place far away.
18. After graduating from New York Law School, Mr. Paul began his law
career as a switchboard operator at a New York firm. Five years into his career, he
accepted a job from a tax attorney - and eventually would become an architect of
the modem income tax system. He was one of the most influential tax advisors to
President Roosevelt, arguing the adoption of a Keynesian approach to regulating the
economy through tax policy. In his private practice, his clients included Henry Ford,
Standard Oil Co., and General Motors. He was also a prolific writer. He died while
testifying before a congressional committee - complaining about President
Eisenhower's tax policies. TAX HISTORY PROJECT, Historical Perspectives, Profiles
in Tax History: Randolph E. Paul, http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.
nsf/cf7c9c870b600b9585256df80075b9dd/afd2a67073f6b87085256f8600681f74?O
penDocument (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) [hereinafter TAx HISTORY PROJECT].
19. See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin, What is Good Tax Practice: A Statement
of the Problem and the Issues Involved, 21 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx'N. 9
(1963) [hereinafter Caplin, Good Tax Practice]. Mortimer M. Caplin practiced law
in New York City from 1941 to 1950 (except for his time in military service) and
then begin teaching at the University of Virginia School of Law in 1950. In 1961, he
was appointed U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue where he served until July
1964, when he resigned to form the law firm Caplin & Drysdale. On leaving the U.
S. government, he received the Alexander Hamilton Award, the highest award
conferred by the Secretary of the Treasury, for his "distinguished leadership." He is
also the recipient of the Achievement Award from the Tax Society of New York
University; Judge Learned Hand Human Relations Award, American Jewish
Committee; Tax Executives Institute Distinguished Service Award; Veterans of
Foreign Wars Public Service Award; and the Virginia State Bar and Virginia Society
of Certified Public Accountants Award. He has received honorary degrees from the
University of South Carolina, Washington College, and St. Michael's College.
VIRGINIA LAW, Mortimer M Caplin, http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/
faculty.nsf/FHPbl/mcaplin (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter VIRGINIA LAW].
20. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. INST.
ON FED. TAX'N. 1067 (1952) [hereinafter Miller, Morality]. Merle H. Miller was
52012]
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Others were tax partners in prestigious firms. Norris Darrell was a partner in
Sullivan & Cromwell.21 Adrian W. DeWind was a partner in Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.22 Thomas N. Tarleau was a partner in Willkie
Farr & Gallagher.23 And, of course, some of the writers were well known
with the Office of Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue prior to joining
Ice Miller as a partner in 1940 and beginning the firm's federal tax practice. Jerry
Crimmins, Ice, Miller Celebrates its 100th Anniversary, Ice Miller Law Bulletin,
(Apr. 12, 2010) http://www.icemiller.com/enewsletter/ICE.news/IM_100_Law
Bulletin.htm. He was instrumental in founding the Indianapolis affiliate of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) - some in the Indianapolis legal
community believed that the ACLU was connected to communism, but Mr. Miller
and his firm believed that the ACLU was good for the law profession and the
community they served. Ice Miller, L.L.P., Firm History, http://www.icemiller.
com/firm history.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). Mr. Miller and his firm partner
Harry Ice were both Eagle Scouts, and they founded the I and M Firesets Company
to manufacture and sell flint and steel fire starting kits to Boy Scouts. The company
was later passed down through the hands of various scouts and troop leaders in
Indianapolis. Ice Miller, L.L.P., Firm Fact Sheet for 100 Year Celebration,
http://www.icemiller.com/news/10OYearFacts.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
21. Norris Darrell, Some Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser in Regard to
Tax Minimization Devices, 8 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 983 (1950)
[hereinafter Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices]. "Mr. Darrell was a partner of
Sullivan & Cromwell for 42 years and president of the American Law Institute for
15 years. He represented the law firm in Paris and Berlin from 1928 to 1930 and was
made a partner in 1934. He was elected to the Council of the American Law Institute
in 1947 and headed a project that laid the groundwork for the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. He retired in 1976, N.Y. TIMES, Norris Darrell, Lawyer and Tax Expert, 90,
(Aug. 15, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/15/obituaries/norris-darrell-
lawyer-and-tax-expert-90.html [hereinafter, N.Y. TIMES]. Mr. Darrell was the son-in-
law of legal legend Learned Hand and, as the executor of his estate, was instrumental
in assisting Hand's former clerk and Stanford Law School professor Gerald Gunther
write a biography of the famed jurist. See Gerald Gunther, 'Contracted' Biographies
and Other Obstacles to 'Truth,' 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 697 (1995).
22. In addition to serving as the head of the tax department at Paul, Weiss,
Rifldnd, Wharton & Garrison, working at the Treasury Department drafting
legislation to fund the war, and advising Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, Mr. DeWind became a founder of Human Rights Watch and served on the
boards of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Coalition
Against Censorship and the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control. Dennis
Hevesi, Adrian De Wind, Tax Expert and Human Rights Watch Founder, Dies at 95,
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/nyregion/
19dewind.html.
23. BORIS 1. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE xi (1965) [hereinafter BIrrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
6 [Vol. 12:1
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law professors: Professor John M. Maguire (Harvard),24 Professor John Potts
Barnes (Virginia),25 Professor Edmond Cahn (New York University),26
Professor Jerome Hellerstein (New York University),27 Dean Erwin N.
Griswold (Harvard),28 and Professor Boris Bittker (Yale), who authored
more than 15 books and whose name is a contemporary synonym for tax
treatises.29
Many of these writers were also significantly involved in
government, politics, and the social and legal movements of the day.
Randolph E. Paul was one of the most influential tax advisors to President
Roosevelt, arguing the adoption of a Keynesian approach to regulating the
economy through tax policy. 30 Norris Darrell was president of the American
Law Institute for 15 years and also worked on the groundwork for the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.31 Mortimer M. Caplin was the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service under John F. Kennedy,
during a time of significant tax reform.32 Dean Erwin N. Griswold joined the
Lyndon B. Johnson administration as Solicitor General, and then continued
as Solicitor General in the Richard M. Nixon administration, eventually
arguing over 100 cases before the Supreme Court (including the Pentagon
24. John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's Tax Practice,
13 TAX L. REv. 27 (1957) [hereinafter Maguire, Conscience and Propriety].
25. John Potts Barnes, The Lawyer and the Voluntary Assessment System,
40 TAXES 1034 (1962) [hereinafter Bames, Voluntary Assessment System].
26. See Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1. See also Edmond N.
Cahn et al., What Makes A Successful Tax Lawyer? A Tax Law Review Symposium, 7
TAX L. REv. 1 (1951) [hereinafter Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer].
27. See Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 4. (Mr. Hellerstein
contributed a paper entitled "Ethical Problems in Office Counseling" at the
symposium banquet).
28. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Blessings of Taxation: Recent Trends in the
Law of Federal Taxation, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1950, at 999 [hereinafter Griswold,
Blessings of Taxation].
29. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23. For tax
lawyers, Professor Bittker needs no footnoted introduction. He wrote over 100
articles and at least 15 books. However, his focus was always on his students. At one
point he even told the Shah of Iran that he could not work on his tax case, no matter
what the pay, until after the current semester. He began his teaching career at Yale
Law School only four years after graduating from the school. Professor Bittker was
also an environmentalist who served many years as a Trustee with the Natural
Resources Defense Council, an avid adventurer, and tremendous photographer. See
Yale Law Report, Boris I. Bittker 1916 - 2005, http://www.law.yale.edu/
YLR/pdfs/v53-1/53lbittker.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
30. See TAX HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 18.
31. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21.
32. See VIRGINIA LAW, supra note 19.
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Papers case). 33 Merle H. Miller was a founder of the American Civil
Liberties Union in Indianapolis. 34 Adrian DeWind was a founder of Human
Rights Watch and served on the boards of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, the National Coalition Against Censorship and the
Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control.35 Professor Boris Bittker was a
Trustee with the Natural Resources Defense Council36 and Professor
Edmond Cahn wrote broadly, authoring books such as The Sense of Injustice
- An Anthropocentric View of the Law (New York University Press, 1949),
The Moral Decision - Right and Wrong in Light of American Law (Indiana
University Press, 1955), and The Predicament of Democratic Men
(MacMillan Company, 1961).
B. Philosophical Professionalism
The tax bar of this time evidenced a remarkable philosophical
sensitivity. In 1949, for example, the Committee on State and Federal
Taxation of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar
Association issued a report on the importance of natural law for tax
jurisprudence.37 The report began:
[T]axation both in its purpose and its method, is at once a
function of government, and, under a philosophy of
government by law rather than by men, a process of law. As
a function of government, taxation, therefore, of necessity
finds roots and justification in the philosophy of
government. As a process of law by which it, as a function
of government, is exercised, it of necessity finds its roots
and justification in the philosophy of law. 38
Having framed taxation between philosophy of government and philosophy
of law, the report continued that "tax laws must of necessity be subject to,
and limited by, certain basic underlying moral principles by virtue of our
33. Associated Press, Erwin N. Griswold; Former Solicitor General, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 1994) http://articles.latimes.com/1994-11-21/news/mn-65525_25
1_solicitor-general.
34. See Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21.
35. See supra note 22.
36. See BITFKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23.
37. Joseph F. McCloy et al., The Moral Issue, 27 TAXES 9 (1949)
[hereinafter McCloy et al., Moral Issue] (this was a portion of a report Mr. McCloy,
Chairman of the Committee on State and Federal Taxation, Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Section, presented to the Committee at a prior meeting).
3 8. Id.
[Vol. 12:18
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American philosophy of government and law," which the report identified as
"the unchanging principles of the natural law." 39 The report then explains
implications of these moral principles, such as taxes being rightfully imposed
only to secure material, spiritual, and social rights of the governed, and that
"in imposing taxes, a due proportion to the wealth of each citizen must be
observed, as distributive justice demands, so that the burden will not exceed
the resources of the individual and he will be proportionately compensated
by the services which come to the people from the tax money."40 The
impetus for this report appears to have been concern about the influences of
legal realism, which "conceives the law to be the rule of conduct imposed in
specific situations by our courts and based upon the court's interpretation of
the feelings, morals and other standards of conduct currently prevailing in
the community."41 The committee warned that legal realism was contrary to
natural law, and that it elevated the authority of courts at the expense of the
authority of "the Supreme Lawgiver, man's Creator.",42
The tax bar's philosophical orientation was broader than philosophy
of law. This broad interest was on full display at the 1952 Tax Law Review
banquet, which was dedicated to discussing Ethical Problems of Tax
Practitioners. The discussion began with topics such as preparing corporate
records to justify accumulating earnings to expand the business (when the
purpose for accumulation may have been more the lawyer's idea than the
client's) but developed into an argument over "whether our generation is
worse or better than previous generations have been."43 Thomas N. Tarleau
maintained that Americans were not "in a degenerate age" but merely "a
more self-conscious age," while Professor Edmond Cahn maintained that
Americans of the day were too "outer-directed," insufficiently "inner-
directed," and generally too conformists with "the obsessive need to be like
everyone else."44 In good law professor style, Dean Miguel A. de Capriles
(New York University) framed another argument of the evening as "the
problem of obedience to the unjust law," questioning the tax lawyers -
without explanation or follow-up - with "it seems to me that we are taking
for granted, are we not, that the Socratic answer is still the right one?" 45
That there would be a banquet discussion on the ethical problems of
tax practitioners evidences the concern these men had for the state of their
39.Id.
40. Id. at 10-11.
41. Id. at 10.
42. McCloy et al., Moral Issue, supra note 37, at 10.
43. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 15 (remarks of Bruno
Schachner).
44. Id. at 2, 10, 14.
45. Id. at 23 (statement of Miguel A. De Capriles, Dean at New York
University School of Law).
2012] 9
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profession in 1952. If "civic and moral obligations were being fulfilled
currently to even a reasonably satisfactory extent, they would not have
played so significant a part in the discussion" at the banquet.46 On the one
hand, there was concern regarding widespread ethical failures among tax
lawyers47 but, on the other hand, there was comfort in the progressing ethical
sensitivity of lawyers - or at least an increase in their discussions of
ethics.48 Professor John Potts Barnes characterized the increase as a "sudden
burst of interest in the tax lawyer's ethics." 49 He wondered if this burst was
a passing fad of the sort that often makes the rounds of lawyers meetings,so a
reflection of great failings among tax lawyers, or a reflection of a more
general "awakening of lawyers generally to the need . . . for shoring up the
ethical foundations of the profession."51 He decided, however, that this burst
of interest was due to "the realization . . . of the special significance of the
tax lawyer's ethical standard," especially in a voluntary assessment system. 52
There was a chorus of calls for greater definition of the tax lawyer's
ethical standard. Mortimer Caplin described the need for "authoritative
guidance in prelitigation tax practice," including an identification of
"practices which, though not necessarily in technical violation of an ethical
code, are, in the words of Mr. Justice Stone ... looked upon ... as 'things
that are not done."'53 Norris Darrell was comforted by the increase in legal
ethics discussions at conferences and by committees, and hoped the tax bar
would become more involved.54 Professor John M. Maguire had a more
specific hope: for the full connotations of the tax lawyer's special obligations
46. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 18.
47. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 32 (statements of Jerome
R. Hellerstein).
48. Norris Darrell, The Tax Practitioner's Duty to His Client and His
Government, 7 PRAc. LAW. 23, 39 (1961) [hereinafter Darrell, Tax Practitioner's
Duty] (this article was based on various addresses, including the N.Y.U. Institute on
Federal Taxation in 1958 where it was subsequently published). See Darrell,
Conscience and Propriety in Tax Practice, infra note 82; Paul, Tax Adviser, supra
note 4, at 412.
49. Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1034.
50. Describing fads in subjects discussed at legal conferences, he wrote "I
have observed that a subject considered a lively one for discussion at one tax
conference is not unlikely to appear on the program of another and another and to be
written about until it has lost the appeal of both novelty and timeliness." Id. I
suppose this is as true today as then.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser - A
Perspective, 40 TAXES 1030, 1031 (1962) [hereinafter Caplin, Perspective].
54. Darrell, Tax Practitioner's Duty, supra note 48, at 39-40.
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to be "spelled out" by a bar committee;5 that is, for the tax bar to be given
"marching orders" in "a number of commonplace situations produced by tax
practice."56
The concern for the ethical well-being of the tax bar was not limited
to committee-crafted solutions to commonplace situations, however. There
was a concern that deeper problems were eroding the profession. Sensitive to
the increasing time and energy required to be expanded by tax lawyers,
Professor Cahn bemoaned the "steady-flowing river of texts, services, and
articles" about taxation that "any tax expert, who is unfortunately required to
earn his living while trying to maintain his expertness" must read in order to
keep up-to-date. 57 Worse, he feared that lawyers were becoming the "jackals
of the bourgeoisie," desiring only to "live the same lives, obtain for their
wives the same type of coats, and ride around in the same automobiles" as
their "mercantile neighbors." When arguing that "we may be fast losing
our status as a profession and becoming nothing more than skilled merchant-
clerks," 59 he thought this loss followed the loss of the sense of "moral
responsibility" and "civic nobility." 60 He described the deeper problem as
lawyers succumbing to an emerging "obsessive need" in American culture to
"be like everyone else, to have the same possessions as everyone else, to
follow the same pattern in the pursuit of material goods."61 The result was
that as lawyers gave into this consumerism, its mentality would transform
them into being "what the communists have always said the lawyers were in
a capitalist society . .. jackals of the bourgeoisie."
C Patriotism
Nineteen fifty-two was the year of the philosophically reflective Tax
Law Review banquet, and also a year in which the Cold War was heated.
There were large scale bombings in Korea (the armistice came in 1953) and
55. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 48.
56.Id. at 45.
57. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 2-3. Randolph E.
Paul described the "wearisome quota of suggestion and criticism and dogma" that
"constantly pour[s] out" from tax magazines and journals. Randolph E. Paul, The
Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARV. L. REv. 377, 378 (1950) [hereinafter
Paul, Responsibilities] (This article is an adaptation, with minor revisions, of an
address before the 1949 Second Annual Institute on Federal Taxation, University of
Southern California School of Law). He even footnotes to an "inventory of the
growing mass of tax materials." Id. at n.8.
58. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id.
112012]
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the communistic threat was on the minds of Americans. In Professor Cahn's
mind, individuality, moral responsibility, and civic nobility buttressed lawyer
professionalism against the potentially accurate criticisms of the communists.
Merle H. Miller sounded a very similar tone, praising an intentional
and international movement of "Moral Re-armament" as perhaps "the most
potent challenge to Communism in the struggle for men's minds," and
framed moral appeals to fidelity to the tax law in this context.63 To Mr.
Miller, the time was one in which there was a "great battle between the West
and East" in which good tax lawyers contributed "greatly to the well being of
the country at large" by "kill[ing] off a bad tax scheme."6 In this time of
great battle, he did not think any tax lawyer wanted to be known for drafting
minutes giving "reasons for not pying out dividends" or writing "long
instruments setting up tricky trusts." For Mr. Miller, the risk that American
capitalism might fail in this great battle was real, and it was the touchstone
for developing sound tax law ethics:
We are engaged in a most challenging economic struggle.
Before too many years will be answered the question as to
which economic system is more efficient, that in which the
properties are owned by the government and operated by
government employees, or that in which the people own the
sources of production, the factories, the distribution
facilities, and from these sources of wealth chip in their
share toward assembling resources to be used for the
common defense and general welfare of the people. It is the
system of taxation which supplies the very life blood of the
government operating under the latter system .... .
Mr. Miller characterized the situation as "the present emergency," and
thought a tax lawyer ought to "do his best to maintain in his fellow citizens a
proper respect for the methods we have set up under a democratic system for
the collection of each citizen's share" of the burden of responding to the
63. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1068. The reference to "Moral Re-
armament" appears to be to the group begun by American Lutheran minister Frank
Buchman, which is now known as the Initiatives of Change International. Mr.
Buchman's philosophy of moral awakening was very influential at this time. Though
not much discussed today, the organization was very active at the end of World War
II, but may be best known today for its connections with the founding of Alcoholics
Anonymous. See Initiatives of Change International, http://www.iofc.org/history
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
64. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1076.
65. Id. at 1075.
66. Id. at 1082-83.
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emergency.67 Merle H. Miller believed that despite feeling that he was
personally "carrying the full brunt of our defense effort" by paying large tax
liabilities, "I can pay the full liability as shown, with even some concessions
in the knowledge that a great deal more would not be an overpayment for the
privilege of American citizenship."68 (Anecdotal evidence suggests that
some clients may have felt similarly 69). Dean Griswold compared the need
for increased revenue during the Cold War to the need for increased revenue
during the "past ten years . . . devoted to protecting us against the Nazi
aggression," concluding that there were no expenditures Americans could
make that would "benefit us more than that we pay to the Government in
taxes [.]'70 Indeed, he wrote that "taxation is a benefit, not a curse" in that it
finances our organized society, and that rather than "groaning about the
burden of taxes" on our money we should remember that we would not have
had money, had it not been for what taxes finance.71 During this threat to
national security, it was important to remember the benefits of taxation he
argued, because "the present state of the world, and the need for protecting
ourselves from the threats directed at our society," meant an increased tax
burden, and the prospect of keeping the war (and communism) localized
meant that it would be cheaper topay "its cost currently, and we will be
better off in the long run if we do." He was worried that in the "midst of a
real shooting war" in Korea, the unfairness of the tax law would be increased
through "loopholes and special privileges" and "handouts," such as those for
the "oil and gas interests."73 The need for a high tax burden and the
unfairness of its distribution prompted Dean Griswold to argue that tax
lawyers had a "public responsibility" to work to ensure that the tax burden
was distributed fairly. 74. He lamented the tax bar's failures with this
responsibility during this threat to the national security.75
67. Id. at 1083.
68. Merle H. Miller, A Taxpayer's Duty to his Fellow Taxpayers, 19 N.Y.U.
ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N. 1, 9 (1961) [hereinafter Miller, Taxpayer's Duty]. Given
the tax rates of the day, one wonders the effective tax rate under which Mr. Miller
did labor - he may have good reason to feel as if he were personally carrying a
great share of the defense burden.
69. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 104-05.
70. Griswold, Blessings of Taxation, supra note 28, at 1002. In reflecting on
the Supreme Court's tax jurisprudence during the war against Nazi aggression, it is
interesting that he concluded the Court favored the Government in those in some part
"because there was a war on." Id. at 1000.
71. Id. at 1002.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1057.
74. Id.
75. Griswold, Blessings of Taxation, supra note 28, at 1057.
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Other writers also referenced the Cold War in the tax ethics context.
Mortimer Caplin pointed out that "our strength as a nation is dependent upon
our ability, year after year, to raise many billions of dollars," much of which
was specifically for the sound financing of "our defense programs" and
"missile and space programs."76 According to Dean Griswold, the privileges
of American citizenship were not limited to personal safety but, included
effectively financing collective improvements to society, 77 and by another
writer more specifically included financing "social security, unemployment
insurance, four-lane highways and other blessings of modem government."78
Merle H. Miller directly connected the efforts of revenue agents with
those who work on "the assembly lines where are built the rockets and
missiles to provide our security" and "those in the armed forces," writing that
it is the revenue agents who are responsible for securing the funds to pay the
assembly workers and armed forces members. 79 Robert N. Miller echoed this
characterization, writing that the agents were "patriotic" and "sustained in
their work by a justifiable pride in their organization."80 He pointed out that
it was a "vital duty of the Treasury ... to maintain dignity and self-respect in
this body of men on whom the government must rely for every dollar of the
government's revenue." 81
On the one hand there was a theme of characterizing the revenue
agents as important enlistees in the Cold War, since it was their work
collecting the funds that made the government's spending possible, but, on
the other hand, the need to police a mass tax touched concerns especially
acute during the Cold War. Both Robert N. Miller and Norris Darrell thought
it was very important that tax administration be conducted without descent
into a "terrorizing" or "police state" mentality on behalf of the revenue
agents, further reflecting Cold War distinctions between the U.S. and
communist regimes.82 Mortimer Caplin expressed concern that "the huge
sums needed to finance our Government" be raised without violating our
"democratic traditions."83 And Professor Boris Bittker raised the fear of "Big
Brother," warning that too close a sympathy for the revenue-collecting
76. Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 9.
77. Griswold, Blessings of Taxation, supra note 28, at 1002.
78. Peter James Wikel, Grandfather Paid Taxes Too, 37 TAXEs 329 (1959).
79. Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 8.
80. Robert N. Miller, Human Elements in the Federal Tax System, 10
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1049, 1050 (1952).
81. Id.
82. Id.; Norris Darrell, Conscience and Propriety in Tax Practice, 17
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N. 1, 23 (1959) [hereinafter Darrell, Propriety in
Tax Practice]. Both Robert Miller and Mr. Darrell tied this concern with the honesty
of taxpayers.
83. Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 13.
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necessities may lead to the belief that the Treasury Department "represents
'all of us' and hence embodies a virtue superior to that of any of us."
D. Duty to the System
Is the tax lawyer a special species of lawyer, one with special duties
not shared by other lawyers? The legal ethics writers in this time wrote of
tax lawyers' "duties," "roles," "relationships," "responsibilities," "loyalties,"
and "obligations"" owed to clients, as well as those owed to the
"government," the "Treasury," "our government and its agents," the "public
interest," the "country," "society," the "state," "other taxpayers,"
"professional responsibility," "public responsibility," and the "United
States."e Some writers described the tax lawyer as having a "double" or
"dual" sets of duties (e.g., "dual responsibility to his client and the
84. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 268.
Professor Bittker's allusion suggests a study of references to contemporary literature
in tax literature might be interesting.
85. E.g., Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 9 ("duty" was used
by Professor Hellerstein); Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1081, ("duty" was used
by Mr. M. Miller); Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 5 ("role" was used by
Mr. M. Miller); H. Brian Holland et al., What is Good Tax Practice: A Panel
Discussion, 21 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx'N.23, 25 (1963) [hereinafter Holland
et al., Panel Discussion] ("obligation," "loyalty," "responsibility," and "relationship"
were used by in the headings and in the text of Seymour S. Mintz's remarks);
BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 241 ("responsibility"
was used by Professor Bittker).
86. E.g., Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual
Responsibility to his Client and to the Government? - The Theory, 15 U.S.C. L.
SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAX PLANNING 25 (1963) [hereinafter Johnson, Theory] (using
the term "government"); Milton Young, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual
Responsibility to His Client and to the Government? - The Practice, 15 U.S.C. L.
SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAx PLANNING 39 (1963) (using the term "government");
Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1036 (using the term
"government"); Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 10 ("treasury" was
used in the statements by Thomas Tarleau); Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1081,
1083 (using the term "our government and its agents" and "country"); Maguire,
Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 44 (using the term "public interest");
Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 2 (using the term "society");
Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 25 (using the term "society"); Holland
et al., Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 25 (Mr. Mintz used the term "state" and
Hugh F. Culverhouse used the term "other taxpayers"); BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 95 (statement by Norris Darrell using the term
"professional responsibility"); BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
23, at 241 (Professor Bittker used the term "United States"); and Caplin, Perspective,
supra note 53, at 1032 (using the term "public responsibility").
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government,") and at least one described a "triple" set of responsibilities.
While the discussion was generally limited to "our" government, a question
was raised as to whether or not the same duty owed to "our" government was
also owed to other governments.
Professor Jerome Hellerstein premised his description of a tax
lawyer's duty to the system on denying that the citizen's relationship to his
government was comparable to a plaintiffs adversarial relationship with a
defendant.89 Professor Hellerstein argued that a citizen owes "his
government and his neighbors the duty of paying his share of taxes," even
though doing so may get him labeled as a "sucker" in the business
community. He argued that tax lawyers "owe to our Government and to
ourselves" the use of "our skill and experience and the great confidence
which our clients repose in us . . . to improve the tax morality of the
community."91
Professor Hellerstein's objective for tax lawyers was to develop a
sense in the general community and in clients specifically that citizens
should pay their share of taxes. Specifically, he argued for developing
"generally ethical standards which require full and fair disclosure by the
taxpayer, [and] which abhor fraud, whether obvious or cloaked in elegantly
drawn documents or befuddled by the stretching of judgments or the
magnifying of doubts." 92 He described this duty as the need to "curb the
excesses of the businessmen whom we represent."93 He suggested these
ethical standards were necessary to avoid "moral schizophrenia or chaos."94
He thought that accomplishing this goal would require tax lawyers to change
their sense of duty, at least in some particulars, but that doing so would lead
to tax lawyers living "happier lives," as well as to a "fairer distribution of the
tax results."95
Professor Hellerstein's references to disclosure and fraud, as well as
his desire to enlist tax lawyers to improve tax morale, indicated that his
87. Holland et al., Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 29 (Mr. Crane C.
Hauser included a duty to one's self (i.e., professional reputation)).
88. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 36; Darrell,
Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 2; BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBLITY, supra note 23, at 97.
89. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 9 (statements of Jerome
R. Hellerstein).
90. Id.
9 1. Id.
92. Id.
93. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 14.
94. See Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 9 n.4 (citing M.R.
COHEN & F.S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 595
(1951)).
95. Id. at 32.
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understanding of the duty to the system was oriented primarily on the duty to
undermine abuses and evasion. The duty to the system, in his mind, was the
duty to refrain from acts such as backdating documents or advising clients to
take unauthorized deductions 96 - activities that he thought were
"widespread."97 Thus, while he argued for a duty to the system, other than
the duty to improve tax morale, the duties he had in mind were not clearly
beyond those applicable to all lawyers.
Professor John M. Maguire separated the tax lawyer's duties into
two categories. The first category consisted of duties applicable to tax
controversies handled by the courts. When tax controversies reached the
courts, tax lawyers had "few if any ethical problems differing from those
encountered by trial lawyers generally."98 The second category consisted of
tax controversies prior to their submission to the courts. With these matters,
tax lawyers had a "double responsibility," one to the client and one to the
public interest.99 Professor Maguire did not attempt to explicate the details of
these "additional obligations" on tax lawyers, but instead called for the full
connotations of these obligations to be "spelled out," perhaps, by a
committee of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation. 00 He did
not consider this to be a speculative matter, but instead a specific derivation
of guidance from the general standards of Circular 230.'0' While he was
mostly concerned for a "systematic" approach to be articulated by a bar
committee, he also thought individuals and firms should consider framing
their own code for navigating their obligations.10 2
Professor Maguire premised the defense of tax lawyers' special
obligations on the idea that the revenue system simply required "a high
degree of acquiescence and cooperation from taxpayers and their experts."03
In other words, in his view, the need to have a "proper pattern" for tax
lawyer conduct was related to the income tax being "a system of voluntary
compliance"1' with the details of these duties being grounded in the
Treasury Department's regulation of tax lawyers. 0 5 Professor Maguire's
concern with the duty to the system was not related to philosophical
reflections on tax lawyering, but instead related to the tax bar's need for
96. Id. at 5, 7.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 30.
99. Id. at 44-45.
100. Id. at 48.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 46.
103. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 45.
104. Id. at 28.
105. Id. at 45.
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"marching orders" in "a number of commonplace situations produced by tax
,,106
practice.
Thomas N. Tarleau characterized the ethical problems encountered
by tax lawyers as "largely the same as those of any lawyer dealing with an
adversary." 07 He wrote that no lawyer, including a tax lawyer, is entitled to
engage in "trickery" or make false statements or misrepresentations. 0 8 Every
adversarial conflict in the legal system brings into tension the lawyer's
responsibility to his client and "his ethical responsibilities as a member of the
bar," and so, in large part, the same responsibilities that are generally
applicable to lawyers cover the ethical problems raised in tax practice. 109
However, Mr. Tarleau argued that tax lawyers are special in two
ways. First, tax lawyers always have the same party on the other side: the
Treasury Department."10 Second, tax lawyers are also enrolled members of
the Treasury Department's bar."' One of the most striking consequences of
this distinctiveness is that unlike other lawyers who are "free to furnish his
adversary facts or refuse to furnish them," Mr. Tarleau believed that the
Treasury Department is entitled to all pertinent information and the tax
lawyer is obligated to provide it. There is no tactical choice available on
providing information. This means, he thought, that the tax lawyer always
has "an obligation to engage in open-handed dealinj with the representatives
of the Department" when it came to the facts.l 3 He believed such an
obligation was sensible because the taxpayer has sole "control of the
facts."114
There are limits and complications to disclosure, of course. Mr.
Tarleau considered the limits of disclosure provided by the attorney-client
privilege, but also situations in which he argued the privilege is not available,
such as return preparation. 1 15 He also emphasized the threshold issue of
determining whether or not particular facts are "material" and must be
106. Id.
107. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 10.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 13.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 11.
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id. He also argued that a lawyer taking care to deliver the pertinent
facts and vouch for their accuracy "insures and protects his own most available asset
- his good reputation." Id. at 13. Query the relevance of the professional reputation
of the attorney. This is his goodwill. It benefits all of his clients. However, there may
be a conflict between his clients. By disclosing unfavorable facts in one client's
situation, the lawyer may thereby purchase a greater goodwill with the agent who
may help with other clients but the disclosure will hurt this one.
115. Id. at 14.
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disclosed or "merely evidentiary" and accordingly need not be disclosed.' 16
Thus, while Mr. Tarleau argued that a general obligation to disclose facts to
the Treasury Department makes the practice of tax law inherently distinctive,
he did not conclude this was a blanket obligation.
Merle H. Miller premised the tax lawyer's duty to the system on
patriotism. He wrote that a tax lawyer
owes a great duty the country that has educated him, and
made possible his present success. He must do his best to
maintain in his fellow citizens a proper respect for the
methods we have set up under a democratic system for the
collection of each citizen's share to meet the present
emergency [i.e., the Cold War.] He must inculcate in each
citizen a respect for the system, and a proper respect for the
part which honesty plays in that system. It is an awesome
responsibility. Pray God that we may have the moral caliber
to meet it.1
Mr. Miller waxed eloquently about the duty to avoid "aiding and
abetting taxpayers in their suspicion, distrust[,] and even animosity toward
those who are writing and enforcing our tax laws."" 8 He understood why a
"layman" might interpret particular applications of the tax law as arbitrary,
and thus the tax lawyer "who should be seeing the overall picture with its
many insolvable problems" ought to increase the layman's respect for the
system.11 9 He thought that a lawyer in another field may be permitted to
"indulge himself in the luxury of agreeing with his client as to everything the
client said about the opposing party," but this indulgence is not available to
the tax lawyer.120 Instead, the tax lawyer is obligated to correct his client's
misconceptions of the system, urging on the client not only respect for the
system but an appreciation of the importance of honesty in their compliance
with the system. Mr. Miller described the American system as "an honor
system," that was necessary to supply the "very life blood of the
government" as it engaged in the struggle against communism.122 For Mr.
Miller, the tax lawyer's duty to "our government and its agents" was the duty
116. Id. at 11.
117. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1083.
118. Id. at 1081.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1081-82.
121. Id. at 1083.
122. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1083.
2012] 19
Florida Tax Review
to encourage honesty and compliance in taxpayers, a duty which was
especially important given the Cold War's demands.123
Mr. Miller's philosophy of tax lawyering did not merely emphasize
the duty of tax lawyers and taxpayers to the government, but also highlighted
the "moral obligations owing by taxpayers one to another, because of their
reciprocal positions as taxpayers." Stressing that "no taxpayer lives
alone," he noted that "most of us recognize a duty, whether or not enacted
into law, to govern our acts with due regard to the effect which our conduct
may have on others."1 25 Mr. Miller was especially concerned with how the
acts of taxpayers "affect other taxpayers favorably or adversely."126 He
described the consequences of these acts in several situations, such as how a
taxpayer's experience with a revenue agent may in large part reflect that
revenue agent's experience with other taxpayers.127 If a revenue agent has
been dealing with a very resistant taxpayer, he will have one sort of attitude,
but if the revenue agent has been dealing with a "victim" who gave up some
"absurd concession," he will have quite another attitude.128 Another example
noted by Mr. Miller was how taxpayers affect one another by using
overworked gimmicks.129 The effect of these acts is such that we should
realize that "most of our woes are brought upon us not by the original
voluntary acts of Congress or the dyspepsia of the Revenue Agent, but as the
inevitable result of fellow taxpayers who took a good thing too far . . .. '1
30
Mr. Miller emphasized that when it comes to "pick[ing] up any part
of the tab," the "government" is not a taxpayer.131 There are no cases in
which the government is one side with all the taxpayers in different
situations on the other.132 Rather, in any case, there is one taxpayer on one
side and all the other taxpayers on the other.133 A "victory" for "the
taxpayers" is one in which the tax burden is to be shared equitably; a defeat
is one in which "one class [of taxpayers] is going to get by for less."'1
34
Norris Darrell phrased his conception of the special duties of a tax
lawyer in terms of "certain social responsibilities," including "the duty,
putting it baldly, to help make our self-assessing income tax system work;
123. Id. at 1081.
124. Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 3.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id. at 6-7.
133. Id.
134. Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 7.
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and the duty . . . to lend . . . one's special talents and experiences to . . .
improving that system in the public interest." 135 He believed a tax lawyer has
a duty to his client and "a duty to live up to his professional
responsibility."l 36
Echoing Merle H. Miller, Mr. Darrell considered a large part of this
duty to be educating and influencing clients to conduct their tax affairs "as
honorably and ethically as the adviser would himself act under similar
circumstances."1 37 He believed this was necessary to the success of the
voluntary compliance system, and thus necessary to avoid "police state
methods" in tax collection.138 He encouraged tax lawyers to help their clients
understand the "public policy reasons underlying the tax rules affecting
them." 139 He thought this encouragement would help clients "understand the
moral implications of what they do," and develop more farsighted judgments
on tax matters. 140 He argued that "ethical propriety and legal effectiveness in
tax planning often shade into each another," frequently resulting in the
ethically questionable plan being also practically questionable.' 4 1
Mr. Darrell charged each tax lawyer with "a further duty, namely, a
duty to do what he can to help make the tax law more fair, practical and
equitable and to improve its administration."l 42 He encouraged each tax
lawyer to "speak out as a citizen," using his expertise to improve the tax
system, "whatever the immediate effect upon his client's pocketbook may
be."' 43 While emphasizing that the lawyer advocating for change in the
system was not working on behalf of a client, he pointed out that "clients
usually understand this" and respect it.144 He did not consider the duty to
work to improve the system (even with a cost to the client) to be inconsistent
with the duty to give "full devotion" to his client.145
Even as Mr. Darrell affirmed that a tax client facing the Treasury
Department as his adversary is entitled to expect the same from his lawyer as
135. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 2.
136. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 95. This
chapter of Professor Bittker's book was a transcription of the first in a series of five
talks on "Lawyers' Problems of Conscience," sponsored by the Harvard Student Bar
Association, in which Mr. Darrell gave a talk entitled "Responsibilities of the
Lawyer in Tax Practice." Id. at 87.
137. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 23.
138. Id.
139. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 101.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 24.
143. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY, supra note 23, at 102.
144. Id. at 102, 103.
145. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 22.
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a criminal defendant facing prosecution, he expressed uncertainty about
"everyday administrative tax practice.,,146 He described this situation as
"perplexing, and one the area is especially in need of further study and
clarification," specifically the question of whether the tax lawyer owed
greater or lesser duties to the Treasury Department than he would a court. 147
Mr. Darrell expressed doubts about the possibilities of a neat and categorical
resolution of this particular issue, but had no doubts that tax lawyers had
social responsibilities to educate their clients on the importance of ethics in
the voluntary compliance system, as well as being involved in other ways to
improve the system.
Even among those writers who did not directly address the
theoretical aspects of a general duty to the system, there were several who,
like Merle H. Miller and Norris Darrell, insisted on the duty to educate
clients on the ethics of tax compliance and the duty to avoid characterizing
the IRS as an unreasonable adversary applying arbitrary rules. Agreement on
this specific duty to the system was voiced by Boston tax lawyer H. Brian
Holland (Ropes and Gray),148 Regional Commissioner of Revenue Dean J.
Barron,149 Mortimer M. Caplin,ISO and Robert N. Miller. 151
Like Mr. Darrell, Professor Boris I. Bittker made clear that he
considered a tax client and a criminal defense client to be in the same
situation - having the government as an adversary and a lawyer who should
be devoted to him.152 He did not think that tax practice was special as a
consequence of the government being on the other side. Nor did he think that
being a member of the Treasury Bar should dilute a lawyer's obligation to
his client. 153 On the contrary, he suggested it was all the more important to
be independent. He wrote "[t]here is a shadow of Big Brother . . . in these
suggestions that the lawyer has special obligations to the Treasury because it
regulates his admission to practice or because it represents 'all of us' and
hence embodies a virtue superior to that of any of us."l 54 He insisted that
while "[t]he adversary system of administering governmental rules and
regulation unquestionably has its drawbacks[j" the right of citizens to deal
with the government at arm's length had such important advantages that it
should not be abandoned.' 5 5
146. Id.
147. Id. at 22-23.
148. Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 23.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 23, 35.
151. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 9.
152. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 267.
153. Id. at 267-68.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 270.
[Vol. 12:122
Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes
Professor Bittker did not think tax practice was a special kind of
legal practice.156 He considered the debate over a special duty to the system
to be academic, arguing that those who stress the lawyer's duty to the client
still believe the lawyer cannot engage in fraud, and those who stress the
lawyer's duty to the government do not believe the lawyer must completely
open his files to the government.157 He thought that agreement on the issues
-158
was to be found in specific situations, not general propositions.
Personally, he believed that the ethics rules common to all lawyers, and
statutory requirements such as a tax return "being verified under the penalties
of perjury," were sufficient to guide ethical tax practice and therefore there
159
was no need to conjure special duties in an attempt to do so.
Randolph E. Paul staked-out a position similar to that taken by
Professor Bittker. He framed the question in terms of whether or not Circular
230 provides "a standard of conduct different from that which binds the
general practitioner representing clients in private litigations,"l 60 much like
Professor Maguire had framed it.161 Although at one time Mr. Paul had
claimed there were special obligations on the tax lawyer, he later was content
to claim that it "is far from clear." 162 By this, he did not intend to "deprecate
the need of a high standard of ethics in the practice of tax law[J"l 63 but
instead considered it debatable whether the high standard of ethics applicable
to tax lawyers was meaningfully distinguishable from the high standard
applicable to all lawyers.164
Mr. Paul also seemed to doubt the usefulness of settling these types
of questions in the abstract, preferring instead to discuss the ethical demands
in concrete cases.165 After considering several such cases, he concluded that
156. Id. at 274.
157. BITrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 268.
158. Id.
159. E.g., id. at 241, 269.
160. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 425.
161. See Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24.
162. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 425. Mr. Paul is the one who
mentions his own conversion on this point. Id. at 425 n.58 (citing his
"Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser."). Both his Rocky Mountain Law Review and
Harvard Law Review articles are tremendously insightful and nicely written, though
the latter Rocky Mountain Law Review article presumably is more reflective of his
later thought. In the earlier Harvard Law Review article, he explicitly championed
the idea that the tax lawyer must not treat the sovereign government as a mere
adversary, as well as going to lengths in other ways to emphasize the uniqueness of
tax practice vis-A-vis other legal fields. See Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57.
163. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 425.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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he had no definitive answer but doubted whether a tax attorney had any
special responsibility.166 While he countenanced the possibility that there are
special rules that may apply to tax lawyers prior to a case entering litigation,
he found it "clear enough that they cease to apply when a civil tax case
reaches the litigation stage . . . ."167 He concluded his analysis with one point
on which he was certain: a tax lawyer ought to use his special expertise and
experience to improve the tax law - and that he ought to do so regardless of
potential client objections to the position he takes.' 6
New York City tax lawyer and treatise author Mark H. Johnson
argued against any special tax lawyer duty to the system by focusing on the
effects of suggesting to clients that their tax lawyers have dual
responsibilities. Mr. Johnson's argument begins with distinguishing between
"the people collectively as a citizenry" and "individual citizens as separate
taxpayers."' 69 A collective citizenry may trust its government and understand
the need for its government to be funded.170 However, an individual
taxpaying citizen also knows that in a tax case he will either prevail and pay
less or the government will prevail and he will pay more. 171 Thus, the
individual taxpayer does have an interest adverse to the government's
interest, even if the collective citizenry does not.172
Mr. Johnson emphasized that the individual taxpayer wants advice
from a lawyer who is "worried about him ... ."173 Mr. Johnson argued that it
is very important that each individual taxpayer is satisfied that his personal
tax lawyer has an undivided duty to him, subsequently giving him the benefit
of "all doubts and of all choices." 74 Only if this duty is satisfied will the
individual taxpayer rely on his tax lawyer.' 75 If he believes his tax lawyer is
not worried exclusively about him, he will resort to self-help.176 The long-
term consequence of tax clients being told their lawyers are not worried
exclusively about them would be "wholesale tax evasion . . . by a skeptical
and unadvised citizenry."' 77
Whereas others argued that the voluntary compliance system
justifies special duties on tax lawyers, Mr. Johnson argued that imposing
166. Id. at 430.
167. Id.
168. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 434.
169. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 28.
170. Id.
17 1. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 29.
174. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 30.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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special duties on tax lawyers would undermine the voluntary compliance
system:
[S]ince the absolute condition to a taxpayer's compliance is
his confidence in his expert's advice, the whole community
has a stake in instilling that confidence . . . we must assure
the taxpayer that the advice he gets is being directed to his
own best interest. He must feel sure that he is not getting the
advice of a conscientious revenue agent, nor even the advice
of a conscientious Tax Court judge. He must know he is
getting the advice of his own counselor and advocate. He
must know, in other words, that his adviser is in his own
corner, and is not in the middle of the ring as a referee. Only
then can the taxpayer be expected to be trustful enough to
throw away his tip sheets and stifle his own protective
instincts. 178
Mr. Johnson offered another argument against imposing special
obligations on tax lawyers. He attributed the "remarkably coherent, uniform,
and equitable body of law" enjoyed by Americans to the adversarial process
with tax lawyers on one side and government lawyers on the other. Tax
lawyers provided a tremendous and necessary benefit to the system, not
because of any special duty incumbent upon them, but by merely acting as
lawyers. so In addition to serving this essential role, Mr. Johnson encouraged
tax lawyers to engage in "disinterested public service," such as work in bar
associations where, he insisted, the lawyers were not to bring their client's
cases to bear.18 '
Like Professor Bittker, Mr. Johnson believed that the ethics rules
applicable to all lawyers were sufficient for tax lawyers.182 He argued that
the recognition of boundaries on a tax lawyer's behavior was not recognition
of a special responsibility to the government. Rather, lawyering within
boundaries -such as avoiding fraudulent representations - was simply "a
matter of my dignity and pride as a lawyer."l 4 Mr. Johnson emphasized this
point stating: "I would hate to think that this is considered some special
obligation of the tax lawyer." 85
178. Id. at 30-31.
179. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 27.
180. Id. at 35-36.
181. Id. at 36.
182. Id. at 32.
183. Id.
184. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 33.
185. Id.
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Professor John Potts Barnes denied that it was the tax lawyer's role
to be "the keeper of the taxpayer's conscience or an instrument for the
implementation of the voluntary assessment system . . . ."186 Much like
Professor Bittker and Mr. Johnson, he believed that the general ethical
obligations of all lawyers to "act fairly and honestly" and "be law-abiding"
and "to advise compliance with the law" was sufficient to guide tax lawyers,
as well.187 Professor Barnes did not hesitate to characterize the client and the
Treasury Department's relationship as adversarial, writing that this does not
reflect any particular view of the government, but simply reflects that the
individual taxpayer, regardless of political orientation, "carries on a running
battle" to minimize his income tax liabilities.188 Similar to the arguments
made by Mr. Johnson, Professor Barnes insisted that a lawyer advising his
client on how to lawfully minimize taxes was not "thwarting or defeating the
system" but, on the contrary, was "assisting in its proper working, because
the taxpayer is as much entitled to the benefits of the law as he is obligated
by its burdens." 89
Professor John Potts Barnes believed that the tax lawyer's ethics did
have special significance in the voluntary assessment system.190 However, it
did not involve the tax lawyer taking on a special role of any sort. Much like
Mr. Johnson, Professor Barnes argued that the tax lawyer, simply by
lawyering, "contributes to the effective operation" of the tax system.191
However, this is neither because the tax lawyer is motivated by some special
duty to the system nor because he sets out with the intention of improving
the system. Rather, it is because he is merely "motivated by the impulse to
give the advice that is for the best interest of the client" and within the
general limits of legal ethics.192 Any duty that would limit the effectiveness
of the tax lawyer's devotion to the client is one that, perhaps paradoxically,
would undermine the benefits to the system provided by the tax lawyer.
Much like Mr. Darrell, Washington D.C. tax attorney Seymour S.
Mintz (Hogan & Hartson) was unable to define a strictly adversarial
relationship between tax clients and the government prior to the two entering
the courtroom.193 With respect to tax advice, he pondered the question of
whether or not tax lawyers had "some greater degree of responsibility to be
objective" than lawyers giving advice in other fields. 194 "The answer to the
186. Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1039.
187. Id. at 1037-36, 1039.
188. Id. at 1037.
189. Id. at 1035.
190. Id.
191. Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1035.
192. Id.
193. Holland et al., Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 23, 58.
194. Id. at 24.
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question is not easy," he said. Mr. Mintz identified three possible answers,
each of which had some support in the tax bar.196 First, he said there was a
"sizeable segment" of the tax bar which believes the ethical considerations
applicable to tax lawyers are merely those applicable in other fields. 197
Circular 230, according to this view, is nothing but a detailed
"implementation or an elaboration" of how those considerations are to be
applied in the tax field. 198 Second, he said there was a "larger group" who
believed that there was "something special and peculiar about practicing in
the tax field ... ."199 This position could be justified by any one or a number
of considerations: the self-assessment system "cannot work in a purely
adversary context;" the sovereign is simply not the same as a "purely civil
adversary;" the taxpayer has control of all the facts; or tax lawyers are
members of the Treasury Bar and, at the minimum, that membership
"demands a higher duty of disclosure .... ."200 Finally, he said there was a
"midway" position unconcerned with theoretical resolutions and grounded
pragmatically:
[Y]ou are never really up against the gun to determine
whether the practitioner does have dual responsibilities, that
is, one set of responsibilities to his client and another set to
the government, but that it is just good business for you, for
the client and for the government to try to minimize
adversary aspects just as much as possible, and to increase
the disclosure aspects just as much as possible, and thereby
to improve relationships among the three of you as much as
possible.201
For Mr. Mintz, practicing tax law at the borderline was "just not
good tax practice or good tax business . . . ."202 With this fact of practice in
mind, he concluded it was a "mere academic exercise when we discuss the
degree to which there is this dual relationship . . . ."203 In his mind, "it is in
our best interest to act as if there were a dual responsibility," regardless of
the academic conclusion.204
195. Id.
196. Id. at 24-26.
197. Id. at 24-25.
198. Holland et al., Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 25.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 25-26.
201. Id. at 26.
202. Id.
203. Holland et al., Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 27.
204. Id.
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Others shared Mr. Mintz's conviction that the difference between
good tax ethics and a good tax practice may be merely academic, at least in
many circumstances. IRS Chief Counsel Crane C. Hauser argued the tax
lawyer's professional reputation within the IRS offices was not "simply a
matter of ethics" but "a matter of dollars and cents to the practitioner."205
Indeed, Mr. Hauser suggested that rather than speaking of dual
responsibilities to client and government, it would be useful to invoke a third
responsibility: the lawyer as to himself, that is, to preserve his professional
reputation. Mortimer Caplin and Mr. Holland agreed that "we will find
ourselves pretty good tax advisers" by avoiding advice that raises ethical
concerns within us.207 New York City tax lawyer Milton Young (Young,
Kaplan & Edelstein) followed this sentiment as well, writing that a moral
reaction is "often a correct forecast of the effectiveness of the plan itself."208
For Mr. Young, it was reasonable to speak of a dual duty to the client and
government, but he emphasized that a "dual responsibility" is not necessarily
a conflicting one.209 It is good for both the government and the client to
avoid bad tax planning, he thought.
E. Duty ofDisclosure
Alongside the debate on the general duty to the system was the more
specific debate on whether or not there was a duty to disclose "doubtful but
arguable points in a tax return."210 Norris Darrell argued there was.2 1 ' For
Mr. Darrell, the relevant issue was not his own professional judgment on the
taxability of the issue but rather his professional judgment as to whether "the
government would probably seek to tax it."2 12 Although he argued for a
general rule to disclose any item that "might be considered taxable by the tax
authorities," he also argued for an exception.213 The exception would be
those situations in which "there were many courts decisions uniformly in his
client's favor but as to which the government bullheadedly simply hadn't yet
205. Id. at 29.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 38. Mortimer Caplin believed that tax lawyers should "accept
their special responsibilities," and that they should be "willing to work cooperatively
for stronger and better tax administration not only for their own interest, but in the
interest of the nation, as well." Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 21.
208. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 39-40.
209. Id. at 39.
210. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILYTY, supra note 23, at 92
(quoting Norris Darrell).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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given up."2 14 And into the calculations of the government's probable interest
- and whether or not the interest was merely bullheaded - Mr. Darrell also
cited the need to consider potential penalties (e.g., for disregarding
regulations) and potential tactical decisions (e.g., making and reporting gifts
in a year in which the need to file a gift return was debatable - so as to start
the statute of limitations).2  Despite his unambiguous argument for a duty to
disclose, it was, ultimately, merely a presumptive duty. He recognized the
"difficulty of generalizing," and wrote that the decision "depends upon your
best judgment as to the law, the merits of any claim of taxability and the
government's probable attitude."216
Mr. Darrell asserted a presumptive general duty to disclose, and
shared his thoughts on what factors might overcome the presumption, but he
did not argue for it from specific theoretical premises. Professor Jerome
Hellerstein, in contrast, deduced a disclosure duty from his theoretical
conviction that the taxpayer and the government were not in an adversarial
relationship in the way a plaintiff and defendant would be.217 Professor
Hellerstein thought that the prevailing norm of the tax bar was "perfectly
clear" that the there was no duty to "recommend full and fair disclosure" in
situations in which the lawyer is "reasonably clear" that the Bureau would
decide the issue adversely, but "not as clear as to what the results will be in
the courts." 2 18 And he believed this would be appropriate were the taxpayer
and the government in a typical adversarial relationship. 2 19 Denying that to
be the relationship, and desiring that tax lawyers would work to improve "tax
morality," he urged tax lawyers to bring their influence "to bear in order to
develop in the community generally ethical standards which require full and
fair disclosure by the taxpayer." 22 0 Professor Hellerstein did not elaborate on
what "full and fair disclosure" meant, nor when it should be provided or
what counter-considerations there might be. He lamented the current ethical
comfort with the lack of disclosure, urging a higher standard, but not
considering the practicalities, at least not in the way Mr. Darrell did.221
214. Id.
215. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 10-11.
216. Id. at 11.
217. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 9 (statements of Jerome
R. Hellerstein).
218. Id. at 8.
219. Id at 9.
220. Id.
221. Due to his rhetorical style, Professor Hellerstein's thoughts on the
subject are arguably ambiguous. He describes the prevailing norm with specificity
but his own assessment of it is rather general. Professor John Maguire concluded that
Professor Hellerstein did not argue for a higher duty of disclosure. Maguire,
Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 42 n.60. Randolph Paul concluded that
he did. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 427. While Professor Hellerstein's
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Randolph Paul did not analyze the duty to disclose in light of an
abstract relationship between the taxpayer and the government, nor did he
lament the current practice. Instead, he described the current practice as more
nuanced than Professor Hellerstein took it to be. In situations where the legal
issues are in a "thicket of obscurity" or lack a "yardstick for the
measurement," such as the ones Professor Hellerstein considered
specifically, Mr. Paul was at ease with the prevailing norm not to disclose.222
Nor did he think disclosure should be warranted when an issue has been
"repeatedly decided favorably to taxpayers" but the Bureau continues a
"policy of persistent litigation." 223 However, he believed that most tax
lawyers would insist the client disclose in order to make substantially
debatable issues "automatically come to the attention of the revenue
agent." 224 In general, Mr. Paul characterized the disclosure territory as one in
which "many borderline problems constantly arise."225 While he did not
stake-out a theoretical position, given his focus on the merits of the
underlying issue, and whether or not the Bureau was unreasonably litigating
an issue, in practical terms it seems quite likely that Mr. Paul's and Mr.
Darrell's positions would reach similar results.
Professor Boris Bittker provided the most thorough analysis of the
issue. Though Professor Bittker thought the issue would be better discussed
at the taxpayer-level (as did Professor Barnes), 226 he left the discussion at the
professional-level as this was where it usually occurred. Professor Bittker
focused on whether or not there was a "professional obligation" to disclose
debatable items, contrasting this from more practical considerations, such as
disclosing to avoid the possibility of a penalty or an extended statute of
limitations or disclosing for "a tactical advantage vis-a-vis other debatable
items in the return . ... 227
Professor Bittker identified two arguments for a general professional
obligation of disclosure. First, the practitioner may be wrong about the
taxability of the item, and disclosure permits the orderly resolution of it.2 28
Second, a taxpayer ought not to benefit from the mere volume of returns,
rhetoric obscures his reasoning in some places, I believe Mr. Paul provided the more
sensitive reading, characterizing Professor Hellerstein as having "regretfully
concluded" that the prevailing norm was against disclosure whereas Professor
Maguire restated Professor Hellerstein's description of the prevailing norm without
catching the fairly clear sense of his regret as to it. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 428.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1038.
227. BITFrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY, supra note 23, at 251.
228. Id. at 252.
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which, without disclosure, might often mean the taxpayer receives a tax
benefit to which he is not truly entitled.
In contrast, Professor Bittker argued, first, while disclosure is
already required in certain specific situations (e.g., receipt of stock in
allegedly tax-free reorganizations), neither the Regulations nor the Service
imposes a general obligation of disclosure.230 Second, if there were a general
obligation, the burden on the Service would be increased tremendously as
there would be "hundreds of thousands of riders" filed annually.2 ' Third, if
there a general obligation of disclosure, it should extend to matters not
usually reflected on returns (e.g., exclusions) and should not be limited to
matters that are (e.g., deductions).2 32 Fourth, there are often complex issues
underlying the relevant tax issue (e.g., allocation of costs of goods sold), and
if there were an obligation of disclosure related to the relevant tax issue, it
would need to extend to the underlying issues. 233
Professor Bittker argued that the fundamental issue was the purpose
of the tax return. On the one hand, the purpose of the return might be
considered to present the taxpayer's opinion as to his tax liability - his and
his tax advisor's honest beliefs about the liability.2 34 On the other hand, the
purpose of the return might be considered to present to the government all it
"ought to know to make the most efficient use of its auditing facilities ...
."1235 If one has the "honest-belief approach to the tax return," then honestly
presenting one's opinion as to the liability is required but flagging an issue
on which the Service is expected to disagree is not. However, if one has the
"audit-assistance concept," then flagging the issue for the Service should be
required.
Professor Bittker held the honest-belief approach. He thought
requiring taxpayers to engage in audit-assistance would be counter-
productive. "[A] vague concept of taxpayer disclosure for debatable items"
would not be an efficient assistance to the Service, and it would impose
significant "moral wear and tear" on the taxpayers (e.g., it would encourage
"hypocritical" claims that certain issues were not really debatable). 23 6 If the
Service determines to seek more specific information in certain situations,
then it should do what it has already done which is to specify what
information it wants in which situations. 237 Specificity - backed with
potential penalties - would be an efficient and clear approach, while an
229. Id.
230. Id. at 252-53.
231. Id. at 253.
232. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 253-54.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 254.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 255.
237. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 255.
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overarching duty to disclose whatever the practitioner thought the Service
might want to review would not.
Professor Boris Bittker admitted the "full-disclosure" approach
carried a loftier "vision of taxpayer cooperation with the government in a
common search of truth" than did his own approach.238 But Professor Bittker
(who suspected the full-disclosure approach reflected the influence of
securities disclosure law on legal practice) 239 was not alone in rejecting it. He
was joined by Professor John M. Maguire, who suspected considerable
hypocrisy on the disclosure issue, writing, "[T]here are more words of
conscientious subservience to the idea of open returns openly arrived at than
unpublicized practice justifies in fact." 24 0 Gerald Wallace believed that so
long as the "attorney is of the position that the Bureau's position is wrong,"
there is no duty to disclose simply "for the purpose inviting close
examination." 2 4 1 Mark H. Johnson believed that having "a reasonable basis
for an advantageous position" is what counts, and there is no reason to
"provoke controversy by advertising the grounds on which it might be
attacked."24 2 Mortimer M. Caplin also did not argue for a general disclosure
obligation, focusing instead on what is specifically required under Circular
230 or as a result of signing a return,243 urging the American Bar Association
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to provide
guidance. 24
F. Practical Advice for Tax Lawyers
The tax lawyers writing on ethics between 1945 and 1965 gave
considerable practical advice on becoming a good tax lawyer. The 1951 Tax
Law Review dedicated its annual banquet to discussing the making of a
successful tax lawyer. The symposium's speakers included Robert N. Miller,
Mark Johnson, and Professor Harry J. Rudick (New York University and
Lord, Day & Lord) who each presented prepared remarks on specific themes.
Randolph E. Paul, Norris Darrell, and Merle H. Miller were not featured
238. Id.
239. Id. at 271. Professor Bittker was not the only writer connecting issues
of tax return disclosure with those of securities disclosures. Mortimer Caplin also
connected the two, simply by questioning if tax disclosure standards should be the
same as what "the SEC requires in a prospectus." Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra
note 19, at 19.
240. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 42.
241. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 31 (statements by
Gerald Wallace).
242. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 32.
243. Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 17; Caplin, Perspective,
supra note 53, at 1033.
244. Id.
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speakers at the 1951 symposium, but they did provide advice on advising in
other venues.
Mark H. Johnson emphasized education as the foundation to being a
good tax lawyer. He believed that given the variety of non-tax legal issues
with which tax lawyers must be familiar, a tax lawyer "probably must place
more reliance than most lawyers upon the adequacy of his law school
education."245 The importance of a broad legal education for the tax lawyer
was not, however, Mr. Johnson's exclusive focus. He indicated the
importance of studying "the great literature of the world."246 Without a tax
lawyer having done so, even "the surface of his speech and writing will
reflect the narrowness of his learning and make his judgment suspect." 247
Mr. Johnson also argued that a tax lawyer must be knowledgeable in world
history, as he believed that such knowledge gave "perspective for the
immediate eddies and currents of the law" and "data for long-term appraisal
and predictions." 248 Mr. Johnson believed that the cultural taste for this type
of learning is "pretty well developed by the time a young man arrives at law
school" and so only if he arrives at law school with such a "desirable
background and habits" does he have much of a chance of not
"retrogressing."249 In addition to knowing the humanities, Mr. Johnson also
argued that a good tax lawyer must know calculus (for understanding life
expectancy curves); economics and statistics (for understanding supply and
demand curves, and especially useful for dealing with the excess profits tax);
government; public finance; and accounting (for the tax lawyer, a "balance
sheet or income statement must be read as easily a baseball box score.") 250
The tax lawyer, Mr. Johnson argued, must understand that he is "a
lawyer who knows something about taxes" and never a "'tax expert' who
happens to be a lawyer.',251 He must "know as much law as any other
lawyer," beginning with "contracts, sales, property, equity, wills,
corporations, partnerships, agency, and negotiable instruments," and, in
addition, he must know "the principles of administrative law ... Tax Court
practice, and the Federal Rules ... [and] all the law of evidence."252 Most of
all, he must know the Internal Revenue Code "at least as well as a minister
knows his Bible," and keep an "orderly mental catalogue" of regulations,
245. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 4 (statements by
Merle H. Miller).
246. Id. at 5.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 5 (statements by
Mark H. Johnson).
251. Id. at 2.
252. Id. at 3-4.
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rulings, and cases (specifically including obsolete authorities as "[t]he
obsolete is . . . key to the current."). 253 In order to succeed, a tax lawyer must
be reconciled to the fact that he always needs to do "more research on
specific problems than is required of his brethren in general practice," and
that the "economic justification is that he will spend less additional time for
his client on those phases of his work than the general practitioner will spend
in finding the tax law."
254
Finally, Mr. Johnson underscored the importance of the tax
knowledge one gains only by "experience." 255 The tax lawyer learns "the
256
workings of the Bureau" by experience. The tax lawyer develops a reliable
predictive intuition as to "a tax official's reaction" by experience.257 The tax
lawyer acquires a reliable clairvoyance in his "guesswork as to long term
'trends"' by experience.258 And it is only by experience the tax lawyer learns
to recognize "patterns in tax problems and solutions." 259
Professor Harry J. Rudick addressed the symposium on the skills
necessary for being a successful tax lawyer. He thought these skills were
"pretty much the same as the skills required for success in the practice of
other fields . . . ."260 Some of these skills, he argued, could "only be acquired
by experience," however, he added that others "are inherent" and "[t]he latter
may be nurtured and developed but unlike cultured pearls, their seeds cannot
be implanted." 261 Whether acquired by experience or birth, he believed that
"the great majority of the tax practitioners who have achieved success" have,
"in significant measure," the skills identified.262
Professor Rudick's list of skills was varied. He considered a "good
memory" as among the most indispensible skills for a successful tax
lawyer. 63 For example, "when a client telephones and wants the answer to
an answerable question," since "[i]n the vast majority of cases the question is
one which the practitioner has looked up before," the quality of the
practitioner's memory can save the client "time and expense.' 64 Of course,
253. Id. at 2.
254. Id. at 4.
255. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 2 (statements by
Mark H. Johnson).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 5 (statements by
Harry J. Rudick).
261. Id. at 6.
262. Id. at 8.
263. Id. at 6.
264. Id.
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not every tax question is readily answerable, but if it is, memory likely will
be the resource that provides the answer. Along with a good memory, a
successful tax lawyer needs to be able to write well and speak well, being
careful to avoid "verbosity and pomposity." 265 The successful tax lawyer
also needs the ability to administer the law office: "to select and train
assistants, delegate work to them, and appraise that work."266 The tax lawyer
who tries to do it all himself eventually suffers professionally, and his
"usefulness to business world and the bar are circumscribed."
267
Finally, the successful tax lawyer must also have good judgment and
be decisive.268 Good judgment, being "a compound of experience,
knowledge, and talent," is
[T]he ability to look at a case "in the round" and not merely
from a single viewpoint; to approach a problem objectively
and without bias; to evaluate the importance of the separate
issues of a case in relation to the entire case; to weigh the
chances of success in litigation; and to foresee the probable
consequences of success or failure in relation to the whole
enterprise . . . . Judgment includes knowing when to listen,
when to argue, and when to stop listening and arguing. It
includes an ability to change one's mind ... .269
When it comes time to make a judgment, the tax lawyer must do so
decisively rather than in an "equivocal or wishy-washy" way.270 It is the
"problems which do not permit . . . categorical solution" that are most likely
to be submitted to the successful tax lawyer, and even where the "suggested
answer is no more than an informed guess, the practitioner is not excused
from stating his position - with an appropriate caveat, of course."
271
265. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 7 (statements by
Harry J. Rudick). As an aside, Professor Rudick notes that "the lower schools" ought
to work harder to remedy writing defects in their students, as his law students were
making "[m]istakes in grammar and spelling" and sentence structure in their
"examination papers." Id. Given the regularity with which this complaint is heard
among law professors today, there is some odd comfort in his expression of concern,
even though I fear he would indict my own lower schools.
266. Id. at 8.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 7-8.
269. Id. at 8.
270. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 7 (statements by
Harry J. Rudick).
271. Id. at 7.
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Robert N. Miller addressed the symposium on "the successful tax
lawyer's character and personal relationships."272 He thought a tax lawyer
must have a "youthful and daring spirit" because "a peculiar quality of tax
controversies is that each one is likely to present at least some unique
features" and so the tax lawyer "will often be called on to enter territory
which is relatively unexplored . . . ."273 This "daring spirit" is different from
the spirit of a lawyer who "never knows when he is licked." 274 The
successful tax lawyer must "recognize the real weaknesses of a situation"
and, more importantly, must be able "to induce the client to recognize them
,,275
- even the client who would rather not. A good tax lawyer must have
"in a special degree the quality of patience," especially when "dealing with
Government conferees," and must be able to foresee "each possible difficulty
. . . the Bureau men" may discover. 276 Additionally, a successful tax lawyer
must be able "to use effectively in his work a number of partners and
assistants, as well as experts in the field of accounting, engineering, and
economics." 277
Perhaps the most interesting highlight of Mr. Miller's very practical
advice is that he subjects it all to the following preface:
[A] truly successful lawyer's career must be consistent with
the lawyer's own achievement of a well-balanced life as an
individual and as a member of the bar.. . . A professional
man who gets the details of his own life into a tangle is not
likely to exhibit broad intelligence in guiding the affairs of
other people; the tax field, particularly, calls for exercise of
general wisdom, because there are very large areas in which
the adviser can get no decisive help from established
precedents.278
According to Mr. Miller, a good tax lawyer must have a well-ordered life in
order to advise well another - that is, if a lawyer's wisdom is not sufficient
to govern his own life, how could it be useful to his clients? As Mr. Miller
put it, the successful practice of tax law may rely more on practical wisdom
than technical analysis.279
272. Id. at 1 (statements by Robert N. Miller).
273. Id. at 9.
274. Id. at 10.
275. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 10 (statements by
Robert N. Miller).
276. Id. at 10-11.
277. Id. at 10.
278. Id. at 9.
279. Id. at 12.
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Although not part of the 1951 symposium, Norris Darrell took time
to provide very specific advice on tax advising. Mr. Darrell described a
typical tax client as someone who wants "to keep his taxes down . .. taking
advantage of every possible loophole in the law" but who "seldom
comprehends the difference between sound and border-line transactions." 280
The tax lawyer has to make a judgment as to the "elusive line between what
may be done and what dare not be done with reasonable tax safety.'281 He
described the common situation in which a tax lawyer finds himself:
We have oftentimes found ourselves in the uncomfortable
position of having to cast a wet blanket over tax
minimization schemes developed by overly enthusiastic
planners, with the attendant risk that we may appear in the
eyes of our clients, who too often confuse cleverness for
competence, to be more negative than constructive
minded.282
Mr. Darrell wrote that "cleverness is not competence" and "the too-
clever, overly-enthusiastic tax planner is likely to be either a limited or an
irresponsible man.'283 But it is "inexcusable to frustrate appropriate and
desirable action because of a lurking fear, born of confusion; only the
incompetent will do that."284 While the good tax lawyer "must only too often
disappoint clients and only too often turn down the fashionable tax device of
the moment," he need not always "take a line so conservative that his clients
drop off to more daring advisers."285 Being either unduly clever or unduly
fearful is incompetent and irresponsible.286 Mr. Darrell sketches out the steps
for competent tax advice - infused not only with "care and caution," but
also "constructive imagination and ingenuity .. ,287
280. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 983.
281. Id.
282. Id. Other ethics writers identified the common need to throw a wet
blanket on tax advice with the risk of appearing too negative-minded. Often times,
the alleged advice comes not from another lawyer or an accountant but the neighbor
"Joe," whose lawyers "dreamed up a wonderful scheme whereby he could save
thousands of dollars in taxes without risking anything." Holland et al., Panel
Discussion, supra note 85, at 35-36. Of course, Joe, having advised his neighbor of
the wonders of his tax lawyers, prompts the neighbor to ask his own lawyer, "Why
don't you consider setting up a scheme like that for me?" Id.
283. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLITY, supra note 23, at 100.
284. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 988.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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To give good tax advice, a tax lawyer must first "make that 'most
inordinate expenditure of time"' in understanding the statute, regulations,
and rulings. The "second tool" the lawyer should acquire is "a thorough
knowledge of [the] so-called tax common law . . . "289 Third, the tax lawyer
"should be thoroughly acquainted with administrative procedure." 290 Fourth,
the tax lawyer must "know how to investigate the ultimate reality" of the
relevant facts, including the "client's real desires and best interests," bearing
in mind that a client is sometimes "influenced too greatly by saving taxes"
and influenced too little by "what he would really want to do" if he
"considered the matter more carefully in the light of his own best interests
and those of his family." 291 The lawyer must also remember the difference
between "facts as related orally by the client and facts which can be proved
to a Court."292 He must be ready to dig up the facts like "a miner who digs
up mounts of earth to reach the ore."293 Mr. Darrell emphasized that being a
good tax lawyer "requires training, experience and real work" in order to
"marshal and analyze facts effectively, and to be able to identify a
transaction by its right name . . . ."294
Having taken these steps, the tax lawyer has not fmished his job but
has just begun the most important part of it. He must realize that the steps
"function only to make judgments informed, and cannot ... take the place of
judgment." 29 He must recognize that the "the line is not a static but a
shifting one."296 He must ponder the relevant history and likely changes,
being careful to interpret "the overriding Congressional purpose"
involved.297 He must realize that a good tax plan should be "adapted to
survive amid the interplay of living social forces" and never "simply jig-saw
cut . . . ."298 It is with these issues that Mr. Darrell believed "that
considerations of moral and ethical propriety and legal effectiveness . . .
often shade into each other" insofar as a "foul-smelling" plan is "likely to be
adjudged ineffective" eventually.299 In this realm of professional judgment,
288. Id. at 984.
289. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 984.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 983, 985.
292. Id. at 985.
293. Id.
294. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 985.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 989.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 988.
299. BrTTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLTY, supra note 23, at 101.
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Mr. Darrell compares the tax lawyer with "the perfume smeller or the wine
taster." 300
Finally, in arriving at his final judgment, the good tax lawyer never
loses "sight of the fact that the tax consideration is only one of the many
factors that should be taken into account," and that "[i]ll-considered action to
escape taxes may prove . . . tragic . . . .,,30 He must then have "a character,
and a breadth of background, training and experience in business and
personal affairs" that will enable him "to put all aspects of the matter before
his client in their proper light so that the client may be guided toward a wise
decision."3
02
Much as Mr. Darrell characterized clients as apt to confuse technical
cleverness for practical judgment, Merle H. Miller believed they were likely
to have "more faith in technicalities" than their lawyers do.303 They think tax
lawyers must have "a bag of tricks that greatly reduces our clients' taxes and
probably get us out altogether on our own."04 Or so they may think, "until
they call on upon us in a professional way and usually leave in amazement
after being told that they really owe more than they thought they did when
they came to see us." 305
Rather than finding tax lawyers to be technical magicians with
secrets for sale, Mr. Miller thought the client was more likely to find a
professional who considers his primary job to be preventing his clients "from
going off on screwy tantrums, diverting their energies into non-productive
tax avoidance activities, to the great detriment of our productive system and
our tax collecting system." 306 Whereas Mr. Darrell wrote that tax lawyers
often have to throw a "wet blanket" on such tantrums,307 Mr. Miller provided
a more graphic description, writing that a tax lawyer spends
nine-tenths of his time killing schemes believed by the
proponents to be new, but which were actually dead and
buried many Revenue Acts and many decisions ago. As we
grow old in the practice, this mortality rate bothers us less
and less, and we come to suspect that the scheme is bad even
300. Id. The tax lawyer's use of the "smell test" was mentioned in Holland
et al., Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 23, 38, 43. The image of the nose as a
useful guide to the tax lawyer appears to have been in circulation among tax lawyers
for quite some time.
301. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 988.
302. Id.
303. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1075.
304. Id. at 1074.
305. Id. at 1074-75.
306. Id. at 1076.
307. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 983.
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before we have heard it. Once a man has become reconciled
to the proposition that there is little new under the sun, this
job of decimating someone else's brain child becomes rather
perfunctory, and even loses some of its zest.30 s
Mr. Miller concluded by writing, "The man who can kill off a bad
tax scheme at its inception is contributing greatly to the well being of the
country at large. 309 Unfortunately, as he put it, "Infanticide is as abhorrent
in the intellectual, as in the physical realm," and so while "[i]t is easy to kill
off someone else's scheme," it is "most difficult to maintain that critical
attitude with respect to one's own creations." 310 And thus, the challenge for a
good tax lawyer is to maintain that critical attitude with respect to his own
advice. 311 Mr. Miller pointed out that we must guard ourselves against
becoming too "enmeshed in the same wishes which motivate our clients" for
when this happens we are "rendered easier to please with our own answers"
and "are most apt to fit together the letter of the statute and the court
decisions" in coming up with "an answer that will satisfy everyone" -
except the "moral sense of the revenue agent and the court that will test it."3 12
Those lawyers, he continued, who may have "been able to invoke righteous
indignation" when killing off some other advisor's "flagrant tax scheme"
may often "fall victim to a lack of moral sensibilities in testing their own
brain creations." Thus, Mr. Miller urged that tax lawyers "should be as
zealous in developing a sense of moral fairness as in acquiring a technical
working knowledge of the Code."3 14 The good tax lawyer needs both
technical knowledge and the sense of moral fairness which is necessary for
testing his own tax advice.
Mr. Miller put great emphasis on this moral sense.31 s He argued that
applying this moral sense to interpreting the tax code was what courts did
when settling cases.316 Citing cases like Gregory, Clifford, and Court
Holding Co. as evidence, Mr. Miller wrote, "We have witnessed during the
past twenty years the growth of court-made law which is to our tax law what
equity was to the old common law." 3 17 The moral sense of the tax lawyer
was similar to this equitable sense of the courts, and it was an essential
308. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1075.
309. Id. at 1076.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1076.
314. Id. at 1077.
315. Id. at 1070.
316. Id. at 1068.
317. Id. at 1070-72.
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qualification of the good tax lawyer because it had become an essential
aspect of evolving tax law. As part of this evolution, statutory formalities
were often "completely or partially disre arded" by the courts "to the extent
necessary to achieve a 'right' result."3 And what was the source of the
sense of a right result? It was nothing other than "the moral sensibilities of
the courts today." 319 This sense of "morality in our courts is the only known
factor accountable" for the decisions cited, he argued.320 Mr. Miller wrote,
"There is a sense of morality rampant in our courts today, ready to take care
of any omission of Congress, or any brilliant scheme of the most brilliant
genius" if such an omission or scheme would "result in an unfair dislocation"
of tax burden.321 The practical tax lawyer considers the long term when
eyeing "a loophole which long research fails to discount . . . ."322 The
practical tax lawyer "will not hesitate to condemn a plan merely on the
ground that it offends his own moral sensibilities" because such a plan is "apt
to be found deficient by a court that would have less desire to find the plan
effective than would the tax counselor."323 Lawyers assuming their "own
moral sensibilities were irrelevant as guides" in interpreting the tax law was
the reason that "[m]any clients are in trouble today."3 4 [N]ow that morality
is part of our tax laws," a taxpayer cannot "afford to have a tax advisor
whose sense of morality is less acute than that of the courts." 325
Randolph E. Paul emphasized the importance of tax lawyers
beginning with a coherent "philosophy on the subject of tax avoidance."
326
Mr. Paul urged tax lawyers to accept that because "[d]ifferent tax
consequences may flow from the different methods of accomplishing the
same ultimate economic result," it follows that taxpayers "are plainly entitled
to select the method which results in the lower tax liability."327 He believed
that there was no reason to "hesitate to advise the client fully and frankly in
choosing among 'the oddities in tax consequences' that emerge from the
different methods of accomplishing the same economic result." 328 The tax
lawyer's personal, ethical, or policy concerns are not relevant to this task; his
task is simply "to help the client reduce his tax liability to the lowest possible
318. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1070-72.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1072.
321. Id. at 1073-74.
322. Id. at 1074.
323. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1074.
324. Id. at 1076.
325. Id. at 1076-77.
326. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 414.
327. Id. at 416.
328. Id. at 418-19.
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legal level or save him from a greater tax liability than his transactions need
to carry."329
Unlike Mr. Johnson, Professor Rudick, and Mr. Robert N. Miller,
Mr. Paul warned that "too many qualifications in other areas of the law may
be a handicap to the tax lawyer." He thought it important that a tax lawyer
not have too much "vested intellectual interest" in other areas of the law," as
it might make him "overanxious to apply in tax territory principles which
will not be welcome there." 331 Income taxation is distinctive in considerable
part due to its being a young field of law, starting only "a little more than a
quarter of a century ago."332 In comparison with other fields of law, Mr. Paul
considered tax law to be less concerned with "form and technicality," and
more oriented towards a "search for underlying substance and basic
realities." 333 In one article, Mr. Paul emphasized the differences between tax
lawyers and other lawyers, but then, having undergone a philosophical
conversion on the specialness of tax lawyerin , he later emphasized the
similarities, at least for certain ethics purposes.3 4 But even that change in
his own thinking, his practical caution of too much interest in non-tax fields
was presumably unconnected with his more abstract shift in ethical
philosophy.
He wrote that when the tax client comes in, that client "may have a
specific plan in mind or he may have a general objective," and he has come
to check with the tax lawyer "whether a given course of conduct will produce
unforeseen tax liability or whether a foreseen liability may be minimized."335
Unlike Mr. Darrell or Mr. Miller, Mr. Paul's criticism of clients was not that
they had too much faith in technicalities but rather their "ingenuity and
uncanny cunning at concealing and suppressing facts," which, he continued,
"pass my poor powers of description."336 In order to get at the facts, he
329. Id.
330. See Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 380.
3 3 1. Id.
332. Id. at 381.
333. Id.
334. Id. In this article, Mr. Paul also distinguished tax law from other fields
by citing that its controversies were between the taxpayers and their government
rather than a private adversary. He asserted this "puts the public interest into the
equation and enormously complicates the responsibilities of the tax adviser." In his
later article in the Rocky Mountain Law Review, he instead argued that the tax field
was not as distinctive from other legal fields, at least not sufficiently distinctive to
necessarily require different ethical norms. He is explicit about his change of mind
on this point. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 425, n.58 (citing his Harvard Law
Review article). For his earlier point of view, see Paul, supra note 162.
335. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 414.
336. Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 382.
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suggested that the lawyer prepare for the "client in writing exactly what he
has told the lawyer orally."33 This technique works because the client "will
hardly be able to resist the temptation to demonstrate the mistakes his lawyer
has made," which "may be humiliating to the lawyer" but, he added, "a little
mortification is a small price for the discovery of the essential facts."3 38
He also criticized clients who "come to a lawyer to cover their own
tracks." 339 These clients, he wrote, "want to follow a given course of action"
and want "the lawyer to share blame if results are disappointing.',340 He
cautioned lawyers in these situations, especially if they are tempted "to give
an immediate opinion." 341 Mr. Paul continued with a reminder that even
though competition for the client pressures the tax lawyer to give in and
"slant opinions in the direction of a client's desires," a lawyer should
always recall that "[iun tax law the day of reckoning is often on earth and not
in heaven." 343 Or, as he otherwise puts this sobering thought: "[T]he tax
adviser's failure will be measurable in dollars and cents, the client's dollars
and cents - and the tax adviser's, as well."
344
Like Mr. Darrell and Mr. Miller, Mr. Paul was careful to make clear
that the tax lawyer should not "put undue trust in the letter of the law." 345 He
argued it is important that the tax lawyer consider "interstitial judicial
legislation," as well as understanding that "the policy of tax statutes is not
always to be found in the literal meaning" used in the statutes, because the
statutes "derive vitality from the obvious purpose as which they are
aimed."346 The tax lawyer, he elaborated, must consider not only what the
law is, but also what it "will become" when giving advice. 347 Continuing,
Mr. Paul indicated that the tax lawyer must know the statute, the regulations,
the rulings, the courts decisions, and the "suggestion and criticism and
dogma" of the "[m]agazines, law reviews, [and] periodicals."348 Mr. Paul
added the tax lawyer must also have the "gift of controlled intuition," the
ability to think "with his profound intestines" when giving his systematized
predictions. 349
337. Id. at 383.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 383-84.
342. Id. at 385.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 379.
345. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 417.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 378.
349. Id. at 379.
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In writing what may well be the best single paragraph on tax
advising, Mr. Paul warned:
Above all things, a tax attorney must be an indefatigable
skeptic; he must discount everything he hears and reads. The
market place abounds with unsound avoidance schemes
which will not stand the test of objective analysis and
litigation. The escaped tax, a favorite topic of conversation
at the best clubs and the most sumptuous pleasure resorts,
expands with repetition into fantastic legends. But clients
want opinions with happy endings, and he smiles best who
smiles last. It is wiser to state misgivings at the beginning
than to have to acknowledge them ungracefully at the end.
The tax adviser has, therefore, to spend a large part of his
time advising against schemes of this character. I sometimes
think the most important word in his vocabulary is "No;"
certainly he must frequently use this word most emphatically
when it will be an unwelcome answer to a valuable client,
and even when he knows that the client may shop for a more
welcome answer in other offices which are more interested
in pleasing clients than they are in rendering sound
opinions.
G. Reform Agenda
In the articles and essays devoted to professional ethics, some of the
tax lawyers also expressed opinions on certain tax reform needs. Professor
Bittker, for example, encouraged the Treasury Department to license or to
enroll all return preparers in order to reduce the abuses of the system, such as
a preparer's wholesale manufacturing of tax deductions and credits.351 Both
Mortimer Caplin and he mentioned the possibility of moving to a British-
styled system in which returns certified by accountants or lawyers would be
subject to less scrutiny.352
New York City tax lawyer and treatise-author Jacob Rabkin
complained about the complexity of the tax law, writing, "[N]o society
developed on so fine-spun a statute or set of laws can help from failing from
its sheer weight." 353 Mr. Merle H. Miller thought the solution to the problem
350. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 416.
351. BLrrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 237-38.
352. Caplin, Good Tax Practice, supra note 19, at 20-21; 15 U.S.C. § 33
(repealed 1970); BFIrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 249.
353. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 17 (statements by
Jacob Rabkin).
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of complexity in the code was to accept imperfections in the code. He
warned against ever pursuing the improvement of the code, "for the perfect
code would be so complex that its inherent complexities would make it
imperfect." 354
Tax expenditures and tax lobbying were also indicted.35 5 Contrasting
the importance of funding the Cold War with the growth of tax expenditures,
Mr. Merle H. Miller complained of a Congress using the tax code "not only
to raise the vast sums we need to maintain . .. a garrison state" but also to
address economic and social issues.356 He argued that special provisions for
one group of taxpayers "may well prove a trap . . . for some other
unsuspecting taxpayers." 357 He also argued that such special provisions have
negative effects on economic competition: "[A] tax advantage obtained by
some scheme, may more than offset the greater production efficiency of a
competitor."358 Similarly, New York City tax lawyer and treatise-author
Richard Kilcullen complained of the complications that arise when Congress
grants "special tax privilege[s] . . . in favor of a particular group," and
Adrian W. DeWind worried about the dangers that tax planning has for
business when it distorts activities merely for tax savings. Dean Griswold
lamented the increase of "loopholes and special privileges" and "handouts"
in the tax codes, specifically identifying those for the oil and gas industry. 361
354. Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 7.
355. The protest against tax expenditures and other reform rhetoric
organized around the concept of a "comprehensive tax base" was analyzed by
Professor Bittker, in "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARv. L. REV. 925 (1967).
356. Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 7.
357. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 22 (statements by Merle
H. Miller).
358. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1069. It is notable that Mr. Miller
phrased the struggle between capitalism and communism in terms of efficiency.
Remembering that Mr. Miller was focused on establishing the efficiency of capitalist
economy over a communist economy his point is not only about business efficiency,
like Mr. DeWind's, but also about national security. Id. at 1083.
359. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 15 (statements by
Richard Kilcullen (McGuigan & Kilcullen, New York City)); JOYCE STANLEY AND
RICHARD KiLCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A GUIDE TO THE INCOME TAx
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, (Tax Club Press 1948).
360. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 14 (statements by
Richard Kilcullen discussing remarks by Mr. DeWind). Mr. DeWind had in mind
plans such as "trying to channel otherwise ordinary business income, otherwise
individual surtax income into the 'dreamland' of capital gains rates." Id.
361. Griswold, Blessings of Taxation, supra note 28, at 1057. Dean
Griswold's reference to "the gross inequities of the law in favor of the oil and gas
interests" prompted Mr. Rex G. Baker, General Counsel of the Humble Oil and
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Mark H. Johnson had a list of problems in the tax system. He said
that there were certain pressures that would continue to prevent the
development of a "sound system of law and a sound system of
administration," including: "lawyers who are economically or spiritually
marginal . . . confiscatory tax rates, silly tax laws, . . . revenue agents who
have to come up with a deficiency, [and] a silly Court Holding Company rule
where, if you take one rule, you come out one way and another, another."362
He said that "unless you eliminate" these pressures, you are always going to
have an unsound tax system.3 6 3
III. REFLECTIONS
When reviewing the tax ethics literature of this era, it is useful to
keep in mind that the authors were practical, professionally accomplished
men. Remembering the law firms to which many of these belonged reminds
us these were not idealists concerned with abstract notions of
professionalism, but men whose practice and clientele were as demanding as
any today. 364 Several of the writers mention the client-related pressures in
which tax lawyers work. Norris Darrell wrote that the good tax lawyer "must
only too often disappoint clients and only too often turn down the
fashionable device of the moment," acknowledging the risk that his
disappointed clients may "drop off to more daring advisers."365 Merle H.
Miller described the tax lawyer's job, in large part, as routinely decimating
some other tax advisor's "brain child," leaving clients disappointed with the
lack of a bag of technical tricks for sale.366 Randolph E. Paul warned that
competitive pressures may tempt the lawyer to "slant opinions in the
direction of a client's desires" and away from good judgment.367 Mr. Paul
emphasized the importance of the word "no," and acknowledged that "the
client may shop for a more welcome answer in other offices."368 There is
also mention of the importance of office management skills, the importance
Refining Co. to write Dean Griswold, and thus began a correspondence between the
two eventually published in Baker and Griswold, Percentage Depletion - A
Correspondence, 64 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1951).
362. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 27-28 (statements by
Mark H. Johnson).
363. Id. at 28.
364. See supra Part II.A. and text at notes 18-23.
365. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 988.
366. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1075.
367. Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 385.
368. See supra text at note 350.
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of being able to work with partners and assistants, 369 and an articulation of
the business model for tax specialists. 370 This practical grounding of these
writers is especially interesting given their philosophical sensitivities and
commitments to duties (such as defending the tax system to clients) that may
seem more likely to have been deduced by someone unconcerned with
financial, competitive, and practical pressures.
In this practice-oriented content, it initially may be surprising to
discover the 1949 tax committee on the importance of natural law. But when
the tax committee issued its report, the importance of natural law was not
considered to be an academic issue.371 In the 1930s, the skepticism of the
legal realists and positivists had prevailed among legal theorists and lawyers.
However, the rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s and 1940s "forced many to
think again."372 The rejection of natural law jurisprudence by German
lawyers had been blamed for their legal authorizations of Nazi acts.373 The
result in America was a retreat from both realism and positivism and a
revival of natural law jurisprudence. 374 Thus, the tax bar likely had the fear
of totalitarianism in mind when it produced its report on natural law,
emphasizing the necessity of the objective moral grounding of reliable legal
analysis. This historical context reveals the practical concerns behind the
report, though the report itself had no practical guidance.
Despite the tax committee's consensus on natural law, the tax
lawyers expressed differences on the relationship between law and morals.
Both Merle H. Miller and Norris Darrell emphasized the objective continuum
between the law and morals, and even claimed a very practical connection
between the two. Both explained the important role of a lawyer's moral sense
in his daily work. Mr. Miller believed the lawyers and judges shared a moral
sense, and he believed that adherence to the moral sense by lawyers and
judges would lead them toward the same legal conclusions.3 7 5 Mr. Darrell
believed that a sustainable tax plan was one in which legal and moral
propriety often shade into one another.376 Mr. Miller and Mr. Darrell's view
369. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 8, 10 (statements
by Harry J. Rudick and Robert N. Miller).
370. Id.
371. McCloy et al., Moral Issue, supra note 37, at 9-11.
372. Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in
Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 427-34 (1996) (discussing how
the problem of totalitarianism of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union transformed
American legal thought).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See supra text at notes 317-25.
376. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILFFY, supra note 23, at 101
(statements by Norris Darrell).
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was that law and morality are coherent, and that good legal judgment
requires good moral judgment. In their view, morality was theoretically
objective and practically essential.
In contrast, Randolph E. Paul was convinced that the tax lawyer's
moral sense had no place in legal analysis. 377 His concern was that the
lawyer's moral sense might be a risk to the client's objective. Interestingly,
Mr. Paul explicitly pushes the lawyer away from his moral concerns when
providing tax advice in the same context as pushing the lawyer away from
his policy concerns. Given Mr. Paul's role as a key tax policy advisor for
Franklin D. Roosevelt, it may well be that Mr. Paul was keenly aware of
advantages his clients were provided under the tax code that, on policy
grounds, he believed should not be available. His emphasis on tax lawyers
being involved in tax legislation, even if it was not in the interests of their
clients, may evidence this concern.379 It may well be that Mr. Paul was
focusing on tax benefits to which the client's entitlement was certain,
warning only that the tax lawyer's personal sense that the law's policy was
ill-founded were irrelevant. In contrast, Mr. Miller and Mr. Darrell appear to
have been focusing on tax benefits that were uncertain and the importance of
an equitable sense when assessing the technicalities of the uncertainties.
After all, Mr. Miller, at least, emphasized that the lawyer and judge share this
sense and as it guides judges, so it should guide lawyers. Mr. Paul never
mentions judges considering these issues, which suggests these would not be
the types of issues on which the moral sense of judges would be relevant.
Perhaps Mr. Paul was merely arguing that when a tax benefit is certain, the
lawyer's moral or political sense against it should not be an impediment to
his client claiming it.
The tax lawyers writing on these topics were devoted American
patriots united by their Cold War concerns. Merle H. Miller focused on the
tax system as the "very life blood of the government operating" under the
capitalist system.380 Mr. Miller characterized taxes as the price paid for
maintaining the capitalist system. Remembering that the highest marginal tax
rate at the time Mr. Miller was writing was 92 percent381 makes evident how
high the risk of communism must have been in his estimation. From our
perspective today, his argument seems almost paradoxical: The government
should take up to 92 percent of taxpayers' taxable income in order to protect
them from the system in which the government has 100 percent "of the
377. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 418-19.
378. See supra note 18.
379. Id.
380. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1082-83.
381. The highest marginal tax rates during this period were: 94% in 1945;
91% in 1946-1951; 92% in 1952-1953; 91% in 1954-1963; 77% in 1964; and 70% in
1965. TAx FOUNDATION, supra note 7.
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properties."382 He argued that not only should Americans pay their share of
taxes but they should do so knowing that "paying a great deal more would
not be an overpayment for the privilege of American citizenship." 383 While
he did not urge Americans to pay more than their fair share, his sentiment
brings to mind the contrasting remark made in an earlier time by Judge
Learned Hand that there is not a "patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."
Dean Griswold argued that with this national security threat, there were no
expenditures Americans could make that would "benefit us more than that
we pay to the Government in taxes[.]" 385 Mortimer Caplin, Robert N. Miller,
and Norris Darrell also explicitly sounded patriotic tones - praising the
defense of country and the government agents who worked to defend the
government's revenue386 - and Professor Hellerstein emphasized the duties
a lawyer owes to his government as a citizen.3 87 This patriotism was no
doubt inspired by Cold War threats, but it also reflects the broad support for
the mass income tax policy.388 Even though the highest marginal income tax
rates for most of this period were over 90 percent, 389 and even though during
the early 1950s, more than 200 federal tax officials resigned, were removed,
382. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1082-83.
383. See Miller, Taxpayer's Duty, supra note 68, at 9.
384. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
385. Griswold, Blessings of Taxation, supra note 28, at 1002. In reflecting
on the Supreme Court's tax jurisprudence during the war against Nazi aggression, it
is interesting that he concluded the Court favored the Government in those in some
part "because there was a war on." Id. at 1000.
386. See supra text at notes 76-81.
387. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 9 (statements by Jerome
Hellerstein).
388. The broad support was produced by the defeat of the totalitarian
regimes in World War II and the post war surge in prosperity. BROWNLEE,
TAXATION IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 119-20. This new system had brought big
changes in a small period of time: From 1939 to 1945, the number of individual
income tax payers increased more than ten-fold (from 3.9 million to 42.6 million).
Though the richest 1 percent accounted for 32 percent of the income tax revenue,
almost 90 percent of the labor force was now filing income tax returns. Id. at 115-
17. In 1940, the income tax accounted for only 16 percent of all taxes collected at all
levels of government, but by 1950 it accounted for more than 51 percent. The
implementation of the new mass tax regime "succeeded because of the popularity of
the war effort." The two were connected in the public mind in some part due to a
Walt Disney-produced propaganda cartoon starring Donald Duck and watched by
more than 32,000,000 theatre-going Americans in 1942. Id.
389. See supra note 381.
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and/or were indicted in connection with a string corruption scandals,390 these
tax lawyers presented themselves as patriotic and optimistic supporters of
their government and its tax system.
There was considerable agreement among the writers that tax
39 1 392lawyers were in need of moral improvement, as were their clients. It
seems likely, and was explicitly mentioned by several, that there could be
considerable agreement on the resolution of specific moral problems, even
though there might be considerable disagreement on the more abstract issue
of whether or not tax lawyers had a special "duty to the system." 393 Indeed,
emphasizing the practical rather than theoretical, several of the writers
claimed that moral problems need not even be debated in strictly moral
terms, as they were convinced that good morals, good lawyering, and good
business coincide. 394 The pragmatism of these men led them not only to
prefer solving particular problems to arguing theoretically, but also led them
to collapse the moral, technical, and business aspects of tax lawyering into
what today we might call a "best practices" approach.
Those writers who argued for a special duty for tax lawyers
emphasized the self-assessing nature of the system and the need for strong
moral principles among the taxpayers in the context of their duties as citizens
in a democracy.39 5 Professor Maguire mentioned the "high degree of
acquiescence and cooperation" needed from both taxpayer and their
experts.396 Norris Darrell phrased it as the duty "to help make our self-
assessing income tax system work," 397 which included, in his mind, making
it work without requiring police state methods.398 Merle H. Miller
emphasized that the duty to be honest and comply with the democratically-
implemented tax system was especially important given the Cold War's
demands. 399 Professor Hellerstein argued that a citizen "owes his
390. In the early 1950s, a string of corruption scandals prompted Congress
to investigate the BIR, where it discovered the consequences of political patronage
and substantial corruption. More than 200 then-current and former tax officials
resigned, were removed, and/or were indicted. In 1952, Truman released a plan for
reorganized the BIR, and the reorganization carried over into the Eisenhower
administration. Thomdike, Reforming, supra note 6, at 755-59, 761-64.
391. See supra text at notes 47-56.
392. See supra text at notes 93, 129, 137, 303, 336, 339.
393. See supra Part II.D.
394. See supra text at notes 303, 323.
395. See supra text at notes 90, 117, 124, 125.
396. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety, supra note 24, at 45.
397. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 2.
398. Id. at 23.
399. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1083.
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government and his neighbors" his share of taxes, and that this recognition
was necessary to avoiding moral chaos in the tax system.40 0
In addition to the claims about a general special duty, there were
claims about specific duties tax lawyers owed. One commonly cited duty
was becoming involved in improving the tax law and its administration.
Norris Darrell and Randolph E. Paul both argued that the tax lawyer should
be willing to improve the system, even if it meant taking positions contrary
to the positions of his clients.401 Mark H. Johnson made a related but
different point, which was that the tax lawyer ought not to work to advance
his client's positions through the bar associations but engage only in
"disinterested public service" there. 402
A second commonly cited duty was the duty of tax lawyers to
educate their clients in an effort to improve their tax morality. Merle H.
Miller argued that the tax lawyer ought to increase the layman's respect for
the system and always be careful to correct his client's misconceptions.403
He believed the tax lawyer ought to increase the client's respect for the
system and appreciation of honestly complying.404 Professor Hellerstein
argued the tax lawyers' duty to improve tax morality extended beyond his
clients and to the community at large.405 The duty of a tax lawyer as a tax
ethics educator (at least for his clients) had wide support among the writers
in the period.406 One wonders what today's tax lawyers would think of such
a duty.
Perhaps the debate over whether or not tax lawyers had a special
duty to the tax system can be understood, in part, as an effort to identify the
benefits tax lawyers provided to the tax system. In some part, the different
characterizations of the benefits tax lawyers provided seem to reflect whether
the writer was focused on the tax lawyer as a litigator or focused on the tax
lawyer as an advisor. Those who focused on litigation emphasized the
benefits lawyers provide through the adversarial system. Mark H. Johnson
attributed the coherence, uniformity, and equitable nature of the tax law to
tax lawyers functioning as adversaries with the government on behalf of their
clients. 07 He thought that a client knowing "his advisor is in his own corner,
and is not in the middle of the ring as a referee" increased the client's support
for the tax system and, as a result, reduced the temptation of clients to
400. See supra text at notes 89-95.
401. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 102-03
(statements by Norris Darrell); Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 434.
402. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 36.
403. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1083.
404. Id.
405. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 14.
406. See supra text at notes 121, 137, 148-51.
407. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 27, 35.
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engage in wholesale tax evasion.408 Professor Barnes also argued that the tax
lawyer, simply by lawyering, makes the tax system more effective. 409
Those who argued for a special duty on tax lawyers were less
focused on lawyers as adversaries and more focused on lawyers as advisors.
For example, Professor Hellerstein focused on advising clients about
deductions and preparing transactional documents when arguing for a duty to
the system.410 Norris Darrell argued that the tax lawyer ought to convince the
client to behave as he, the lawyer, would when faced with the duty to
calculate and report his own tax liabilities. 411 He thought it was important for
the tax lawyer to be willing to disappoint the client with his advice.412 And
Merle H. Miller thought the tax lawyer contributed "greatly to the well bein
of the country at large" by killing off bad tax schemes at inception.41
Professor Maguire, Thomas N. Tarleau, Norris Darrell, Randolph E. Paul,
and Seymour S. Mintz all agreed that tax lawyers engaged in litigation are
engaged in an adversarial process not significantly different than others -
but that more perplexing ethical issues of tax practice occur outside of the
414
court room.
One perplexing issue outside the court room was whether or not to
disclose "doubtful but arguable points in a tax return."415 Only Professor
Hellerstein argued for disclosing all positions it was reasonably clear the
government would oppose, regardless of the strength of the taxpayer's or
government's position.416 Other writers focused on the quality of the
government's anticipated position. Norris Darrell and Randolph E. Paul
argued that it is difficult to lay down a general rule, but usually debatable
issues should be disclosed unless the debate would arise only because the
government was unreasonably stubborn on a given issue.417 Gerald Wallace
took this approach a step further, concluding there should be no duty of
408. Id. at 31.
409. Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1035.
410. See Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 5, 7 (statements by
Jerome Hellerstein).
411. Darrell, Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 23.
412. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 988.
413. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1076.
414. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 10 (statements by
Thomas Tarleau); Maguire, Conscious and Propriety, supra note 24, at 30; Darrell,
Propriety in Tax Practice, supra note 82, at 22-23; Holland et al., Panel Discussion,
supra note 85, at 24 (statements by Seymour S. Mintz).
415. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, supra note 23, at 92
(statements by Norris Darrell).
416. See supra text at notes 218-21.
417. BITrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILYTY, supra note 23, at 92; supra
text at notes 224-27.
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disclosure so long as one believed the government's position to be wrong.418
Making the duty to disclose turn on anticipating the government's response
and being able to assess the quality of that response before it is made is a
more complicated standard than assessing the quality of one's own position.
Mark H. Johnson and Boris Bittker each focused on the assessing one's own
position, with Mr. Johnson claiming no disclosure was needed so long as the
position was reasonable, and Professor Bittker claiming no disclosure was
needed so long as it reflects an honest belief about the tax liability.419 In
addition to the substantive quality of the position, Professor Bittker cited
concerns about overwhelming the government with disclosures and the
difficulty in defining the lines of a general duty of disclosure.420 His concern
was that the lofty rhetoric of taxpayers actively cooperating with the
government should be checked by the likelihood of unintended
consequences. The discussion of the duty of disclosure highlights the
complexity of the tax lawyer's role in a self-assessing system - the need to
self-assess the quality of one's own legal advice, the need to assess the
quality of the government's anticipated legal response, and the
administrative needs and limits of the system. Notably, no one alleged that
an adversarial relationship between the taxpayer and the government meant
that the government had no right to demand disclosure or that the taxpayer
had the right to engage in the audit lottery.
There was wide agreement that there was no special duty on tax
lawyers who were litigating. But Borris Bittker,421 Mark J. Johnson,422 and
Professor John Potts Barnes423 were adamant that there was no special duty
on tax lawyers in any situations, and Randolph E. Paul, though not
"adamant" about the lack of such special duty, thought it was rather
doubtful.424 None of these lawyers, however, should be understood as
arguing for a low ethical standard. Indeed, their concern was quite different.
They argued that all lawyers are subject to high ethical standards, and to
claim that tax lawyers are subject to especially high standards runs the risk of
implying other lawyers are subject to lesser standards. Their concern was to
defend the ethical integrity of the bar as a whole, worrying that
characterizing tax lawyers as having special ethical concerns made too much
418. Cahn et al., Ethical Problems, supra note 1, at 31 (statements by
Gerald Wallace).
419. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 253-55;
Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 32.
420. BIrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 23, at 253.
421. Id. at 267-69.
422. Johnson, Theory, supra note 86, at 28.
423. Barnes, Voluntary Assessment System, supra note 25, at 1039.
424. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 425. See Maguire, Conscious and
Propriety, supra note 24, at 27.
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of a difference between tax lawyers and other members of the bar. From this
perspective, the debate over a special duty of tax lawyers reflects an
interesting tension between those authors who emphasized the similarities
between tax lawyers and other lawyers, and those who emphasized the
differences between different types of lawyers. Was the tax lawyer a tax
professional who happened to be lawyer or a lawyer who happened to have
tax expertise? One wonders how much this discussion indirectly reflected
concerns over how the tax field ought to be divided between lawyers and
accountants. During this period, accountants were being accused of engaging
425in the unauthorized practice of law for tax-related work, lawyers who were
also accountants were forbidden from practicing both professions,426 and, as
Dean Griswold put it, "[t]he two great professions of law and accountancy
were squared away for a battle royal."427 Perhaps this battle with accountants
persuaded those who denied any special duty on tax lawyers to do so as an
effort to establish that tax lawyers were not only primarily but essentially and
exclusively lawyers, sharing professional commonalities with all the other
members of the bar but no other profession. Tax lawyering was lawyering,
and only tax lawyers were authorized to do it, was perhaps the subsurface
theme. Interestingly, within only a couple of years, Randolph E. Paul, one of
the most influential tax lawyers during this time, switched his emphasis from
the differences between tax lawyers and other lawyers to the similarity
between the two. Perhaps this shift was influenced in some part by his
sensitivity to this inter-professional debate, and his lending his weight to the
proposition that tax lawyers were lawyers, not a unique or hybrid "tax
professional" with duties and powers still open for description.428
425. See, e.g., Agran v. Shaprio, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619
(1954).
426. In 1961 the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Ethics issued
Ethics Opinion 297, which prohibited a lawyer-accountant from practicing both. The
following year, Opinion 305 took the position that those who are both lawyers and
accountants are not entitled to hold themselves out only as accountants but to engage
in the practice of law. Maintaining the division between lawyers and accountants
was foremost in the mind of at least some members of the Committee. Michael S.
Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 343,
436 (2008) [hereinafter Ariens, American Legal Ethics].
427. Erwin N. Griswold, Role of Lawyer in Tax Practice, 10 U.S.C. SCH.
L., MAJOR TAX PLANNING 1, 1 (1958) (commenting on the consequence of the
Agran case creating strife between lawyers and accountants). See also Erwin N.
Griswold, Lawyers, Accountants and Taxes, 10 REC. ASS'N B. CrrY N.Y. 52 (1955)
reprinted in 18 TEX. B. J. 109 (1955); Erwin N. Griswold, A Further Look: Lawyers
and Accountants, 41 A.B.A. J. 1113 (1955).
428. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 425. See Maguire, Conscious and
Propriety, supra note 24, at 27.
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When it came to describing how it is tax lawyers ought to go about
being good tax lawyers, perhaps the most interesting emphasis was the de-
emphasis of technical analysis. Randolph E. Paul characterized tax law as
less formal and technical than other fields of law.429 Robert N. Miller
claimed the tax lawyers have to rely more on practical wisdom than technical
analysis,430 and Merle Miller argued that confidence in a technical approach
to taxation was the mark of naYve clients rather than good tax lawyers.431
Norris Darrell described the acquisition of knowledge of the tax code,
regulations, and rulings, as one requiring "an inordinate expenditure of
time," but only the very first step in tax advising.432 This technical
knowledge had to be placed in the light of the client's situation, legal history,
Congressional purpose, and moral propriety. The tax lawyer was called
upon for his judgment, which Mr. Darrell compared with that of a "perfume
smeller or wine tester," and certainly never called upon to cleverly "jig-saw
cut" technical arguments.434 Merle Miller emphasized the importance of
being "as zealous in developing a sense of moral fairness as in acquiring a
technical working knowledge of the Code," as he believed that a lawyer who
failed to accept the relevance of his own moral sensibilities would push his
clients into trouble.435 Randolph E. Paul warned against putting "undue trust
in the letter of the law," remembering the underlying purpose of the law, and
relying on professional intuition when giving tax advice.436 In sum, broad
judgment was what a tax lawyer needed and not mere technical expertise.437
This judgment is informed not only by knowledge of the law and its purpose,
but also, Mark H. Johnson argued, by the study of literature and history.438
Robert N. Miller described the necessary type of judgment not as a
professional attribute but a personal one - the judgment that led the lawyer
into a well-balanced personal life was what he had in mind.439 Thus, in these
tax lawyers' minds, good technical analysis was necessary but insufficient
for good tax lawyering. Good tax lawyers were wise, not merely clever.
429. Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 381.
430. Id. at 9.
431. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1075.
432. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 984.
433. Id. at 985-89; BITrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
23, at 101 (statement by Norris Darrell).
434. Darrell, Tax Minimization Devices, supra note 21, at 988.
435. Miller, Morality, supra note 20, at 1076-77.
436. Paul, Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 417.
437. See Paul, Responsibilities, supra note 57, at 378-79, 381, 385; Paul,
Tax Adviser, supra note 4, at 416-17.
438. Cahn et al., Successful Tax Lawyer, supra note 26, at 4-5 (statements
by Mark H. Johnson).
439. Id. at 9 (statements by Robert N. Miller).
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In the past decade especially, we have become accustomed to
detailed practice regulation from the Treasury Department44 o - and detailed
comments from tax bar committees.441 It is helpful to remember there was
not the same type of guidance, regulation, or committee work during most of
the period in which these lawyers were writing.442 Indeed, some of the
lawyers called for increased efforts of exactly this sort. Professor Maguire
called for "marching orders" from the bar or Treasury Department for "a
number of commonplace situations produced by tax practice," and his call
was echoed by Norris Darrel and Mortimer Caplin.443 The tax lawyers
writing in 1945-1965 were sketching their personal approaches on ethical
issues without having to consider, or having the benefit of considering, much
sustained corporate reflection and articulation. It is interesting that they also
sketched their ethical approaches without significant reference to either the
ABA canon of professional ethics or any state bar's rules; today it would be
unthinkable that a lawyer would seriously analyze professional ethics issues
without using the ethics rules as rules. Perhaps the boldness with which
some of these older approaches were expressed is attributable to the then
wide-open range of the discussion, unbounded by much formal guidance or
regulation, much bar committee work, or much interest in formal ethics
rules. Their bold and open discussion preceded the evolution of legal ethics
into the law of lawyering,444 and it shows.
One is left to ponder what the perspective of these earlier tax lawyers
with their earlier understanding of professional ethics would have on many
of today's issues. With their philosophical concern for the relationship
between law and morals, how would they perceive theorientation of the
discourse on the technical regulation of the profession by the Treasury
440. See David Weisbach and Brian Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice
andAdvisors, 130 TAX NoTEs 1279 (Mar. 14, 2011).
441. See, e.g., ABA Tax Section Offers Views on Proposed Circular 230
Guidelines, TAX NOTES, Dec. 20, 2010, at 1319.
442. There was some committee work in this area. For example, in 1951,
the American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants issued an advisory Statement of Principles relating to Practice in the
Field of Federal income Taxation. See Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants: A
Study of Interprofessional Relationships, 36 TAX LAW. 26, 27 (1982). In 1965 the
American Bar Association issued Formal Opinion 314 on standards for tax return
advice. See ABA Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) reprinted in 51
A.B.A. J. 671 (1965).
443. See supra notes 53-56, 105; see generally supra Part II.F.
444. For a discussion of the development of legal ethics into the law of
lawyering governed by the ABA Model Rules, see, e.g., Ariens, American Legal
Ethics, supra note 426, at 444-53.
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Department? 445 With their interest in improving both the tax savings and the
tax morality of their clients, how would they perceive the attacks and
defenses of tax shelter lawyering?446 With their emphasis on providing solid
tax advice, what would they make of today's opinion and disclosure
standards?4 7 If they had witnessed the last half-century's developments of
tax law, tax lawyering and tax law administration, how would their ideas of
the duty to the system have developed?448 Given their love of country and
their experience of the Cold War and near-confiscatory tax rates, how would
they react to today's anti-tax rhetoric during the "War on Terror" and much,
much lower rates? While it is interesting to ponder how the tax lawyers of
more than half century ago would consider us today, it is perhaps more
interesting to ponder how the tax lawyers of 2065 will.
445. See, e.g., Camilla E. Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the
Tax System Reconsidered, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 1197, 1197 (2003); David T.
Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment
Limitations on the Regulation ofProfessional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 843, 874 (2006).
446. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the
Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAx REv. 43, 90 (2001).
447. See, e.g., Brett R. Wells, Voluntary Compliance: "This Return Might
Be Correct But Probably Isn't, " 29 VA. TAX REv. 645 (2010).
448. See, e.g., David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and
Others - the Civil Liability of Tax Lawyers Made Possible by Acceptance of a Duty
to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 172 (2009).
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